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Abstract	
	
In	 1959,	 the	 Republic	 of	 China	 (ROC)	 government	 on	 Taiwan	 enacted	 its	 first	
international	 agrarian	 development	 mission	 to	 the	 Republic	 of	 Vietnam	 (RVN).	 The	
mission	 began	 modestly	 to	 assist	 primarily	 with	 crop	 improvement	 and	 farmers’	
associations.	But	by	the	fall	of	the	RVN	in	1975,	Taiwanese	development	constituted	a	
global	 project	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 Guomindang	 (GMD)	 regime	 to	 redefine	 Taiwan’s	
place	 in	 the	world.	This	article	explores	 the	 sixteen-year	 span	of	missions	 to	Vietnam,	
drawing	on	reports	by	Taiwanese	agricultural	team	leaders,	oral	history	interviews	with	
Taiwanese	 technicians,	 Taiwanese	 and	 Vietnamese	 policy	 documents,	 and	 visual	 and	
propaganda	 materials	 published	 by	 the	 GMD	 and	 overseas	 Chinese.	 Agrarian	
development	 became	 a	 platform	 through	 which	 the	 ROC	 represented	 Taiwanese	
success	 at	 agricultural	 science	 and	 rural	modernity.	 Taiwanese	 technicians	 showcased	
high-yielding	 crop	 varieties,	 large	 and	 luscious	 green	 vegetables,	 and	 rationalized	
agricultural	 implements.	Simultaneously,	Taiwanese	 teams	also	emphasized	 their	 rural	
roots,	 through	 an	 expertise	 in	 forming	 farmers’	 associations	 that	 appealed	 to	 RVN	
leadership	 seeking	 to	 battle	 communist	 insurgency.	 These	 representations	 of	 success	
and	sacrifice	allowed	the	GMD	regime	to	portray	the	ROC	as	leading	a	global	vanguard	
of	 developing	 nations,	 all	 toward	 the	 goal	 of	 securing	 its	 legitimacy	 at	 home	 as	 a	
developmentalist	regime.	
	
Keywords:	Taiwan,	Guomindang,	Vietnam,	agrarian	development,	rural	development,	
agricultural	science,	farmers’	associations,	Cold	War	
	
Introduction	
	
On	 November	 13,	 1963,	 Taiwanese	 rice	 technician	 Zhang	 Dusheng	 (張篤生,	 Chang	
Tusun)	 was	 in	 a	 jeep	 returning	 to	 Saigon	 after	 visiting	 a	 rice	 experiment	 station	
approximately	 70	 kilometers	 (43.5	 miles)	 outside	 the	 city,	 when	 his	 convoy	 was	
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ambushed	 by	 Vietnamese	 communist	 forces	 and	 he	 was	 killed	 by	 gunfire.1	In	 the	
subsequent	 months,	 Zhang	 was	 made	 into	 a	 martyr,	 not	 of	 war	 but,	 rather,	 of	
development.	Cheng	Hsin	Daily	News	(Zhengxin	xinwenbao	徵信新聞報,	later	renamed	
China	 Times	 [Zhongguo	 shibao中國時報]),	 a	 pro-government	 and	 pro-Guomindang	
(Nationalist	 Party,	 or	 GMD)	 newspaper	 in	 Taiwan,	wrote	 that	 Zhang	was	 “one	 of	 the	
many	 technical	 experts	 who	 are	 away	 from	 their	 homes	 to	 help	 foreign	 nations,	 as	
under-developed	as	or	more	under-developed	than	ours,	in	developing	their	resources.	
They	 have	 enabled	 many	 [foreign	 nations]	 to	 understand	 more	 correctly	 of	 [sic]	 the	
industrious	spirit	and	the	scientific	knowledge	of	our	countrymen.	Their	contribution[s]	
in	foreign	countries	are	as	great	as	in	their	own	country.”2	
In	 the	 dozens	 of	 newspaper	 articles,	 interviews,	 and	 speeches	 that	 followed,	
Zhang’s	 martyrdom	 forged	 a	 new	 narrative	 of	 Taiwan’s	 engagement	 with	 the	 world.	
Following	 its	 defeat	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party,	 the	 ruling	 GMD	
regime	framed	the	Republic	of	China’s	(ROC)	international	affairs	around	an	existential	
battle	with	communism	and	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC)	regime.	As	 I	show	in	
this	 article,	 agrarian	development	missions	 to	Vietnam	starting	 in	1959	expanded	 this	
narrative	 beyond	 retaking	 mainland	 China	 from	 the	 Chinese	 Communists	 to	 include	
development.	The	ROC	was	demonstrating	its	technology,	perseverance,	and	modernity	
to	the	Global	South.	In	the	rural	villages	of	Vietnam,	dozens	of	Taiwanese	teams	worked	
side	 by	 side	 with	 Vietnamese	 farmers	 to	 showcase	 greener,	 lusher	 vegetables,	 more	
efficient	 and	 practical	 farm	 implements,	 and	 stronger	 Taiwanese	 rural	 organizations.	
The	fervent	anticommunism	of	the	Cold	War	was	present,	but	it	was	complemented	by	
a	 new	 narrative	 of	 development	 rooted	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 modernity	 and	 strength	
through	economic	self-sufficiency.	By	the	1970s	and	1980s,	with	the	thawing	of	the	Cold	
War	in	East	Asia,	economic	growth	and	success	increasingly	became	an	important	point	
of	 legitimacy	and	state	power	for	the	GMD	to	the	extent	that	they	eventually	eclipsed	
the	Cold	War	anticommunism	as	predominant	topics	of	state	discourse.	
Development—the	 practice	 of	 improving	 well-being	 and	 livelihoods,	 usually	
through	“modern”	methods	of	agricultural	science,	capitalism,	or	rural	organizations—
was,	in	its	initial	international	implementation	in	1959,	imagined	by	Taiwanese	planners	
as	 a	 limited,	 “technical”	 endeavor.	 “Technical”	 was	 often	 a	 misleading	 descriptor,	
                                                 
1	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	Telegram,	November	14,	1963;	“駐越農技團工作及協助華僑籌建紗
廠及張篤生遇難等”	[The	work	of	the	agricultural	technical	team	in	Vietnam,	assisting	overseas	
Chinese	in	preparation	to	construct	a	textile	factory,	the	killing	of	Zhang	Dusheng,	etc.];	Archive	
Number	[館藏號]	020-011004-0101;	page	38;	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	Collection,	Academia	
Sinica	Modern	History	Institute	Archives	(hereafter	MFAC	ASMHIA).	
2	“Condolence	to	Tusun	Chang,”	Cheng	Hsin	Daily	News,	Taipei,	November	17,	1963.	Translated	
document	located	in	Folder	842,	Bản	dịch	các	bài	báo	Taiwan	liên	quan	đến	cái	chết	của	ông	Tu-
Sun-Chang,	thành	viên	phái	đoàn	kĩ	thuật	canh	nông	Trung	Hoa	Dân	Quốc	đến	Việt	Nam	năm	
1963	[Translation	of	Taiwan	articles	related	to	the	death	of	Tusun	Chang	[Zhang	Dusheng],	
member	of	the	ROC	agricultural	technical	team	to	Vietnam	1963],	Nha	Canh	Nông	[Directorate	of	
Agriculture],	Vietnam	National	Archives	II	(hereafter	VNA).	
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however,	 as	 anthropologist	 James	 Ferguson	 (1990)	 has	 argued	 in	 his	 study	 of	
development	 in	Lesotho,	and	by	the	1970s	Taiwanese	development	missions	were	not	
just	about	 technical	assistance.	Since	 its	 takeover	of	Taiwan	 in	1945,	 the	GMD	regime	
has	been	 involved	 in	an	ongoing	development	project	of	disciplining	and	restructuring	
the	 island’s	 rural	 society	 through	 farmers’	 associations,	 public	 health,	 financialized	
capital,	 land	 reform,	 and	modern	 technoscience.	 Taiwanese	 overseas	 development	 in	
the	Vietnam	context	attempted	to	bring	to	Taiwan	the	lessons	of	development,	such	as	
the	utility	of	farmers’	associations	as	instruments	of	extending	state	control	and	making	
rural	 society	 legible.	 As	 this	 article	 demonstrates,	 over	 the	 decades,	 development	
evolved	 into	 an	 important	 platform	 that	 enabled	 the	 state	 to	 build	 a	 new	 globally	
derived	 identity	 centered	 on	 modernity,	 and	 subsequently	 wield	 through	 knowledge	
dissemination	and	propaganda	to	consolidate	its	authority.	
International	 development	marked	 a	 new	 frontier	 for	 Taiwan’s	 interactions	 with	
the	world.	 The	1959	Vietnam	mission	was	 the	 first	 such	 effort	 that	 placed	 Taiwanese	
technicians	and	experts	in	rural	areas	outside	the	island.	This	initial	mission	was	modest	
in	 scope—just	 over	 a	 dozen	 technicians,	 specializing	 in	 plant	 breeding,	 fisheries,	 and	
farmers’	associations,	who	were	then	tasked	with	aiding	Vietnamese	state-led	efforts	in	
crop	 improvement	 and	 rural	welfare.	 From	 the	ROC	perspective,	 anticommunism	and	
GMD	 leader	and	dictator	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	quest	 to	 form	Cold	War	alliances	provided	
geopolitical	incentives	for	offering	assistance.	By	the	mid-1960s,	technical	assistance	to	
the	 Republic	 of	 Vietnam	 (RVN)	 and	 other	 noncommunist	 Asian	 regimes	 became	 a	
significant	 complement	 to	 military	 assistance.3	Chiang	 incorrectly	 believed	 that	 North	
Vietnam	was	completely	controlled	by	the	PRC	regime.	He	viewed	actions	in	Vietnam	as	
part	of	a	greater	international	anticommunist	strategy	that	could	not	be	limited	to	the	
borders	 of	 any	 one	 country,	 and	 development	 offered	 an	 additional	 means	 to	 stop	
Chinese	Communist	 advances.4	Development	 became	an	 increasingly	 vital	 tool	 in	 ROC	
international	 diplomacy.	 In	 turn,	 development	 grew	 more	 influential	 in	 shaping	 the	
Taiwanese	state	and	national	identity.	
The	 Vietnam	 missions	 were	 especially	 significant	 as	 the	 first	 international	
development	missions	undertaken	by	Taiwan.	Over	the	course	of	the	1960s	and	1970s,	
Taiwanese	agrarian	missions	expanded	from	one	to	two	dozen,	covering	every	corner	of	
the	 developing	 world—Asia,	 Africa,	 the	 South	 Pacific,	 and	 Latin	 America.	 The	 African	
missions	during	that	period	were	a	form	of	development	diplomacy	and	a	cornerstone	
of	 ROC	 foreign	 policy,	 especially	 because	 the	 ROC	 was	 under	 threat	 from	 PRC-allied	
communist	 bloc	measures	 to	 remove	 the	 ROC	 from	 the	United	Nations.	 ROC	 officials	
traded	agricultural	development	assistance	for	votes	from	newly	decolonized,	UN-voting	
member-states	 from	 the	African	 continent	 (J.	 Lin	 2015;	 Liu	 2006;	Wang	 2004).	 There,	
                                                 
3	The	ROC	had	several	groups	of	military	officials	and	advisors	to	the	RVN	following	a	1960	
meeting	between	Chiang	Kai-shek	and	Ngô	Đình	Diệm.	For	more	details,	see	Lin	HT	(2015,	288–291).	
4	This	was	a	sentiment	relayed	via	the	U.S.	Embassy	in	Taipei,	and	not	a	direct	quotation	of	
Chiang.	Telegram,	“President	Appreciation	for	Actions	of	Non-Communist	Asian	Peoples	in	
Vietnam,”	7/27/65,	#13,	“China,”	Country	File,	NSF,	Box	238,	Lyndon	B.	Johnson	Library.	
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they	deployed	many	of	the	 lessons	 learned	 in	the	Vietnam	missions,	 including	evoking	
the	discourse	of	 Third	World	 solidarity	 and	 commonality	between	Taiwan	and	African	
(or	 Vietnamese)	 peoples,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 importance	 of	 non-Western	 methods	 of	
achieving	postcolonial	strength	and	independence.	
From	1959	until	the	end	of	the	Second	Indochina	War	(Vietnam	War)	in	1975,	the	
once-limited	 Vietnam	 teams	 represented	 a	 new	 means	 of	 legitimacy	 for	 the	 ROC	
regime.	 Through	 development	 missions,	 ROC	 planners	 demonstrated	 that	 they	 were	
developed	 enough	 to	 help	 foreign	 nations	 achieve	 the	 same	 growth	 and	 rural	 living	
standards	of	Taiwan.	At	home,	this	evidence	of	technical	mastery	reinforced	a	new	facet	
of	ROC	authoritarianism	and	state	power—the	celebration	of	the	modern,	economically	
independent	nation	that	staked	its	claim	internationally	as	much	as	domestically,	and	on	
equal	grounds	with	the	West.	No	longer	was	the	ROC	a	developing	nation,	but	a	nation	
whose	advanced	agrarian	development	brought	demand	for	 its	expertise	globally,	and	
put	it	at	the	global	vanguard.	
Scholars	 have	 largely	 overlooked	 the	 importance	 of	 agrarian	 development	 for	
understanding	modern	Taiwanese	history,	and	have	overlooked	the	impact	of	Taiwan	in	
global	 development	 history.	 In	 the	 English-language	 literature,	 political	 scientist	 John	
Garver	 has	written	 about	 ROC	 assistance	 to	 Vietnam,	 albeit	 briefly	 and	 only	within	 a	
diplomatic	context	(Garver	1997).	In	the	Chinese-language	literature,	historian	Lin	Hsiao-
ting	has	written	on	 the	ROC-	RVN	diplomatic	 relationship,	 focusing	mostly	on	military	
assistance	(Lin	HT	2018).	Most	consequentially,	historian	Simon	Toner	has	written	about	
how	RVN	officials	under	President	Nguyễn	Văn	Thiệu	looked	to	Taiwan	and	South	Korea	
as	potential	development	models	 (Toner	2017).	Toner	makes	the	 important	claim	that	
Vietnamese	 officials	 found	 relevance	 in	 their	 Asian	 neighbors	 instead	 of	 the	 United	
States	or	 the	West	because	“Taiwan	and	South	Korea	offered	an	alternative	model	of	
governance	that	appealed	to	the	[government	of	Vietnam]:	depoliticized	masses,	 loyal	
to	the	authoritarian	state	and	mobilized	for	economic	development”	(Toner	2017,	782).	
Like	 Taiwan,	 South	 Korea	 and	 Japan	 also	 engaged	 in	 international	 development,	
especially	in	Southeast	Asia	where	for	decades	they	rendered	agricultural,	medical,	and	
infrastructural	 development	 (Mizuno,	 Moore,	 and	 DiMoia	 2018).	 For	 RVN	 leaders,	
Taiwan	represented	a	“romance”	or	“imagining”	of	what	an	 idealized	RVN	could	be:	a	
developed,	authoritarian	state.	
Integrating	archival	sources	from	Taiwan,	Vietnam,	and	the	United	States—as	well	
as	an	oral	history	interview	with	a	retired	Taiwanese	technician	deployed	to	Vietnam—
this	article	traces	how	Taiwanese	experts	attempted	to	transplant	elements	of	their	own	
modernity	abroad.	 It	then	shows	how	the	development	project	 in	Vietnam	became	an	
imaginary	for	the	Taiwanese.	The	purpose	of	development	was	as	much	performative	as	
modernizing,	 and	 that	 performance	 was	 in	 furtherance	 of	 ROC	 objectives	 to	 portray	
itself	as	a	modern,	 technologically	advanced,	humanitarian,	and	prosperous	 society	 to	
the	 Global	 South	 and	 especially	 to	 those	 at	 home.	 Thus,	 this	 article	 follows	 how	 the	
GMD	regime	presented	its	overseas	development	to	a	fractured	Taiwanese	audience	to	
further	 its	 regime	 legitimization	and	consolidation,	and	how	 it	portrayed	development	
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to	 a	Vietnamese	and	 global	 audience	 as	 evidence	of	 its	 commitment	 to	“Free	World”	
friendship	and	anticommunist	internationalism.	
	
Why	Taiwan?	Vietnam	and	the	Rural	Problem	
	
In	 1955,	 Ngô	 Đình	 Diệm	 took	 power	 as	 president	 of	 the	 newly	 declared	 Republic	 of	
Vietnam	in	a	coup	that	deposed	Bảo	Đại,	the	head	of	the	State	of	Vietnam.	Diệm	was	a	
fervent	anticommunist	and	nationalist	opposed	to	both	French	colonial	presence	in	the	
State	of	Vietnam,	as	well	as	Hồ	Chí	Minh’s	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam	regime	that	
occupied	Vietnam	north	of	the	17th	parallel.	By	then,	U.S.	aid	had	been	increasing	after	
French	losses	to	communist	insurgency	in	Indochina,	and	Vietnam	was	seen	as	a	crucial	
territory	that	required	U.S.	guidance	and	tutelage	(Miller	2013,	72).	Several	prominent	
American	 development	 experts	 were	 appointed	 to	 serve	 in	 Vietnam,	 including	 Wolf	
Ladejinsky,	 the	 land	 reform	expert	attached	 to	 the	U.S.	Department	of	Agriculture.	As	
historian	 Edward	Miller	 has	 observed,	 experts	 like	 Ladejinsky	 and	 others	 in	 charge	 of	
technical	aid	and	rural	development	policy	in	Vietnam	all	had	prior	experience	in	other	
Asian	 countries	 (Miller	 2013,	 79).	 This	 was	 certainly	 the	 case	 for	 William	 H.	 Fippin,	
Director	of	Agriculture	for	U.S.	Operations	Mission	to	Vietnam	(USOM/Vietnam).	
Before	he	served	as	Director	of	Agriculture	for	USOM/Vietnam,	Fippin	was	one	of	
two	 American	 commissioners	 from	 1952	 to	 1957	 for	 the	 Sino-American	 Joint	
Commission	 on	 Rural	 Reconstruction	 (JCRR)	 in	 Taiwan.	 Consisting	 of	 five	
commissioners—three	 Taiwanese	 and	 two	 American—the	 JCRR	 was	 tasked	 with	
formulating	 agricultural	 policy	 for	 the	entire	 island.	 Fippin	was	 a	 farmers-organization	
specialist	 who	 had	 overseen	 several	 of	 the	 farmers’-association	 reforms	 in	 the	 early	
years	of	 JCRR	 tenure.5	As	 a	 result	 of	 his	 five	 years	with	 the	 JCRR,	 Fippin	not	only	was	
intimately	 familiar	 with	 the	 operations	 and	 expertise	 of	 the	 JCRR	 in	 farmers’	
associations,	 but	 also	 believed	 that	 Taiwan	 was	 a	 particularly	 successful	 case	 of	
agricultural	development.	
In	1957,	the	International	Cooperation	Administration	(one	of	the	predecessors	to	
the	U.S.	Agency	for	International	Development)	reassigned	Fippin	to	Vietnam,	an	area	of	
increasing	 security	 concern.	 Shortly	 after	 his	 arrival,	 Fippin	 wrote	 to	 his	 former	
colleague,	JCRR	Commissioner	Shen	Zonghan	沈宗瀚,	 that	“the	agricultural	program	is	
the	 largest	 and	 in	 their	 eyes	most	 important	 (except	 of	 course	 the	military)”	 for	 the	
Vietnamese,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 seeking	 American	 aid	 to	 fight	 the	 growing	
communist	threat6	
                                                 
5	Jiang	Menglin	to	W.	I.	Myers,	May	23,	1951;	Archival	Collection	Number	[入藏登錄號]	
034000000351A;	Folder	“Myers,	W.	I.,”	in	“Shen	Zonghan	Letter	Drafts”	[沈宗瀚文件稿];	Council	
of	Agriculture	[農委會],	Executive	Yuan	Collection	[行政院],	Academia	Historica	Archives	[國史館]	
(hereafter	EYC	AHA).	
6	Letter	from	William	H.	Fippin	to	Shen	Zonghan,	August	31,	1957;	Archive	Number	
034000000337A,	“沈宗翰文件稿（4箱)”	[Shen	Zonghan	document	drafts	(“Fippin,	W.	F.”)];	
Council	of	Agriculture,	EYC	AHA.	
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On	April	 4,	 1959,	 in	 a	memorandum	 to	 the	Deputy	Minister	 of	 Foreign	Affairs,	 a	
Taiwanese	 Foreign	 Affairs	 official	 in	 Vietnam	 wrote	 that	 “in	 discussion	 with	 USOM	
Agricultural	Director	Fippin	and	Vietnam	Agricultural	and	Forestry	Minister	Lê	Văn	Đồng,	
the	U.S.	has	prepared	US$300,000,	to	invite	twenty	or	thirty	foreign	agricultural	experts	
to	provide	assistance.”7	The	initial	decision	to	invite	Taiwanese	experts	was	made	largely	
at	 the	 behest	 of	 Fippin,	 stemming	 from	 his	 experience	 as	 JCRR	 commissioner.	 The	
Taiwanese	official	 in	Vietnam	continued,	“Because	of	Fippin	having	been	in	Taiwan	for	
many	years,	and	having	worked	well	with	many	people	within	our	agricultural	circles,	he	
has	 strongly	 advocated	 to	 invite	 [experts]	 from	 our	 side.	 The	 RVN	 Agricultural	 and	
Forestry	Minister,	however,	is	interested	in	hiring	French	experts.”8	The	RVN	preference	
for	French	experts	was	unsurprising	given	the	long	colonial	relationship	between	France	
and	Indochina.	The	decision	to	choose	Taiwanese	experts	was	unusual	because	it	broke	
with	colonial	preferences	 for	French	experts,	marking	 the	power	of	American	advisors	
under	Diệm.	It	was	not	Vietnam’s	first	exposure	to	Taiwanese	development,	however.	
Vietnamese	 officials	 in	 Bảo	 Đại’s	 State	 of	 Vietnam	 (1945–1954),	 which	 preceded	
Ngô	 Đình	 Diệm’s	 Republic	 of	 Vietnam	 government,	 had	 been	 observing	 the	
developments	of	the	JCRR	in	China	and	Taiwan	as	early	as	1949.	In	a	document	from	the	
State	of	Vietnam	Ministry	of	Public	Works	and	Transportation	(Bộ	Công	Chánh	và	Giao	
Thông),	 possibly	 a	 translation	 of	 English	 JCRR	 documents	 by	 Vietnamese	 officials,	 the	
JCRR	was	described	as	focused	on	“bringing	earnings	to	the	rural	population”	and	“also	
recognizing	the	value	of	 long	term	research	and	education.”9	The	document	continued	
to	explain	 that	 the	 JCRR	was	not	a	program	designed	 to	 funnel	 large	amounts	of	U.S.	
currency	 “because	 experience	 has	 shown	 in	 Asia,	 it	 was	 difficult,	 at	 least	 in	 the	
beginning,	 to	 expend	 large	 sums	 quickly	 and	 in	 a	 reasonable	 (wise)	 manner.	 On	 the	
contrary,	it	is	a	lively,	dynamic	program	that	begins	by	finding	what	is	necessary	for	an	
ordinary	 farming	 family	 (une	 famille	 ordinaire	 d’agriculteurs).”10 	Although	 it	 is	 not	
entirely	clear	where	this	translation	originated,	it	was	most	likely	read	by	officials	of	the	
Ministry	of	Public	Works	and	Transportation.	In	contrast	to	development	programs	that	
are	seen	as	highly	capital-intensive,	a	picture	of	 the	JCRR	emerges	as	a	program	more	
attuned	to	the	needs	of	the	rural	peasant.	
Nonetheless,	the	decision	to	invite	Taiwanese	development	experts	in	1959	should	
be	 attributed	 mostly	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 William	 Fippin.	 Fippin’s	 position	 as	 head	 of	
                                                 
7	Letter	to	Deputy	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	(次長),	April	4,	1959,	“駐越農技團,”	[Agricultural	
technical	team	in	Vietnam];	Archival	Collection	Number	[入藏登錄號]	020000030452A;	Ministry	
of	Foreign	Affairs	Collection,	Academia	Historica	Archives	(hereafter	MFAC	AHA).	
8	Letter	from	William	H.	Fippin	to	Shen	Zonghan,	August	31,	1957.	
9	Programme	de	la	Commission	Mixte	Pour	la	Reconstruction	Rurale	en	Chine	[Program	of	the	Joint	
Commission	for	Rural	Reconstruction	in	China],	1949,	Folder	02,	Tài	liệu	về	chương	trình	tái	thiết	
nông	thôn	Trung	Quốc	năm	1948–1949	[Documents	of	the	rural	reconstruction	plan	in	China	1948–
1949],	Bộ	Công	Chánh	và	Giao	Thông	[Ministry	of	Public	Works	and	Transportation],	VNA.	
10	Programme	de	la	Commission	Mixte	Pour	la	Reconstruction	Rurale	en	Chine	[Program	of	the	
Joint	Commission	for	Rural	Reconstruction	in	China],	1949,	Folder	02,	VNA.	
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USOM/Vietnam	Agriculture	and	as	former	head	of	the	JCRR	gave	him	a	direct	link	to	the	
Taiwanese,	 but	 there	 were	 also	 intellectual	 reasons	 behind	 the	 choice	 beyond	 mere	
coincidence	and	convenience.	
RVN	 leaders	believed	 its	 rural	problems	to	be	social	and	economic	 in	nature.	The	
countryside	was	where	the	National	Liberation	Front	(called	“Việt	Cộng,”	or	Vietnamese	
Communists,	 by	 anticommunists	 in	 the	 South)	 operated	 and	 drew	 support.	 Both	 the	
RVN	 and	 the	 United	 States	 thus	 targeted	 rural	 areas,	 leading	 to	 “pacification”	
counterinsurgency	campaigns	beginning	in	1954	(and	even	earlier	under	French	colonial	
rule	and	the	State	of	Vietnam),	and	the	Strategic	Hamlet	Program	of	1962	designed	to	
bring	 counterinsurgency	 military	 tactics	 to	 the	 countryside	 (Stewart	 2011,	 49;	 Miller	
2013,	233;	Carter	2008,	123).	
However,	 the	 two	 allies	 differed	 in	 their	 approaches	 for	 programs	 to	 counter	
communist	 insurgency.	 Fippin	 and	 other	 U.S.	 officials	 realized	 that	 Diệm’s	 demands	
were	 centered	 on	 amassing	 as	 many	 U.S.	 dollars	 with	 as	 few	 strings	 attached	 as	
possible.	 Fippin	 sought	 to	 discourage	 this	 by	 emphasizing	 low-cost,	 high-impact	
solutions	that	could	be	realistically	achieved	with	American	assistance.	Translated	 into	
policy,	this	emphasis	meant	focusing	on	projects	that	could	be	easily	implemented	and	
would	not	require	significant	capital	or	labor	resources.	“Water,”	Fippin	wrote,	was	the	
“biggest,	 and	 most	 difficult	 problem,	 but	 one	 that	 we	 can	 do	 relatively	 little	 about.	
Problem	 is	 too	 large.	 Have	 seen	 an	 old	 French	 estimate	 that	 control	 of	 the	Mekong	
would	 run	 to	 the	 magnitude	 of	 several	 billion	 U.S.	 dollars.	Will	 be	 a	 long,	 long	 time	
before	anything	much	is	done	in	that	direction	so	all	we	can	do	is	a	dab	here	and	a	dab	
there.” 11 	Water	 was	 indeed	 a	 major	 topic	 of	 discussion	 among	 twentieth-century	
development	experts,	and	the	Mekong	River	delta	in	particular	was	a	target	of	the	U.S.	
Bureau	 of	 Reclamation	 as	 well	 as	 Japanese	 overseas	 development	 (Sneddon	 2015;	
Moore	 2014).	 Fippin,	 however,	 was	 more	 concerned	 with	 factors	 he	 believed	 the	
Taiwanese	could	help	resolve.	
Fippin	 honed	 in	 on	 practices	 at	 which	 the	 Taiwanese	 excelled:	 “varietal	
improvement,	fertilization,	pest	control	and	cultural	practices.”	12	These	were	four	core	
areas	of	improvement	for	the	JCRR	and	the	background	of	its	agricultural	science	roots	
in	Republican-era	mainland	China,	as	well	as	in	Taiwan	under	Japanese	colonial	rule	(J.	
Lin	 2015).	 Taiwan	 benefited	 from	 an	 extensive	 hydrological	 legacy	 left	 by	 Japanese	
colonialism,	 and	 water	 infrastructure	 projects	 continued	 under	 the	 JCRR	 with	 U.S.	
funding.	However,	Taiwan’s	 innovations	 in	 less	expensive	and	more	easily	transferable	
forms	 of	 development	 were	 more	 prominent,	 and	 certainly	 noteworthy	 for	 Fippin.	
Finally,	Fippin	also	observed	that	for	“very	much	of	the	southern	area	floating	rice	is	all	
that	can	be	grown,	and	yields	are	pitifully	low—slightly	over	one	metric	ton	per	hectare.	
One	 crop.” 13 	Taiwanese	 teams	 were	 well	 versed	 in	 high-yield	 rice	 selection	 and	
breeding,	having	contributed	the	semi-dwarfing	parent	Dee-geo-woo-gen	(dijiao	wujian	
                                                 
11	Letter	from	William	H.	Fippin	to	Shen	Zonghan,	August	31,	1957.	
12	Letter	from	William	H.	Fippin	to	Shen	Zonghan,	August	31,	1957.	
13	Letter	from	William	H.	Fippin	to	Shen	Zonghan,	August	31,	1957.		
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低角烏尖)	 to	 the	miracle	 rice,	 IR-8.	 They	 were	 also	 observant	 of	 soil	 conditions	 and	
climate	that	would	welcome	non-rice	crops,	such	as	corn	or	mustard	greens,	which	were	
planted	by	Taiwanese	teams	in	Vietnam.	
	
Seeds:	Translating	Taiwanese	Science	to	Vietnamese	Contexts	
	
In	 December	 1959,	 the	 Republic	 of	 China	 began	 its	 development	 assistance	
missions	 to	 the	 Republic	 of	 Vietnam.	 The	 Vietnam	 missions	 initially	 consisted	 of	
technicians	 and	 scientists	 specializing	 in	 farmers’	 associations	 and	 cooperatives,	 crop	
improvement,	and	fisheries.	Over	the	course	of	the	program’s	roughly	sixteen	years,	 it	
expanded	 to	 more	 than	 twenty-four	 provinces	 in	 the	 RVN	 (see	 figure	 1)	 to	 include	
veterinary	medicine,	entomology,	soil	science,	and	irrigation.	
A	major	focus	of	the	1959	mission	was	crop	improvement,	with	a	highly	regarded	
plant	breeder	Ma	Baozhi	(馬保之,	Paul	C.	Ma)	at	its	head.14	Ma	began	his	career	as	an	
agricultural	scientist	in	China,	graduating	in	1929	from	one	of	the	preeminent	centers	of	
agricultural	 science,	 University	 of	 Nanking	 (Jinling	 daxue	 金陵大學),	 followed	 by	 his	
doctorate	 in	 plant	 breeding	 at	 Cornell	 University,	 and	 then	 a	 year	 doing	 research	 at	
Cambridge	University.15	Upon	 returning	 to	China	 in	1934,	Ma	 took	a	position	with	 the	
National	Agricultural	Research	Bureau	(NARB,	Zhongyang	nongye	yanjiu	shiyansuo	中央
農業研究實驗所),	in	charge	of	operating	the	NARB	Guangxi	Extension	Station.	In	1944,	
he	was	appointed	the	head	of	the	Agricultural	Division	within	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	
and	Forestry	(MOAF,	Nonglin	bu	農林部)	of	the	ROC,	and	he	later	became	the	Deputy	
Chief	 for	 the	Agricultural	Rehabilitation	Commission	established	by	the	MOAF	to	work	
with	the	United	Nations	Relief	and	Rehabilitation	Administration	in	China.	After	moving	
to	 Taiwan	 with	 the	 Nationalist	 regime,	 Ma	 became	 the	 dean	 of	 the	 College	 of	
Agriculture	at	the	preeminent	National	Taiwan	University.	In	choosing	Ma	as	the	leader	
of	 the	 first	 Crop	 Improvement	 Mission	 to	 Vietnam,	 the	 ROC	 sent	 one	 of	 its	 most	
experienced	and	 respected	plant	breeders	 abroad.	After	his	brief	 time	as	head	of	 the	
Crop	 Improvement	Mission	 in	 Vietnam,	 he	 spent	 over	 a	 decade	 employed	 by	 the	UN	
Food	 and	 Agriculture	 Organization	 as	 the	 dean	 of	 the	 College	 of	 Agriculture	 at	 the	
University	of	Liberia.	
	
                                                 
14	“對外宣傳彩色專刊─中日經濟簡訊、先鋒計畫第三國訓練、中華民國統計提要、歷史經
濟資料簿”	[Color	special	issue	for	foreign	dissemination—ROC-Japan	economic	brief,	Operation	
Vanguard	third	country	training,	ROC	statistic	summary,	history	and	economic	resource	book],	
April	1975;	Folder	“中華民國對外技術合作”	[ROC	Foreign	Technical	Cooperation],	Vol.	2;	
Archive	Number	36-01-006-025;	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs	Collection,	Academia	Sinica	
Modern	History	Institute	Archives,	Taipei,	Taiwan.	
15	Announcement	of	the	Graduate	School,	Official	Publication	of	Cornell	University,	July	15,	1933;	
vol.	25,	page	141;	Cornell	University	Library.	Announcement	of	the	Graduate	School,	Official	
Publication	of	Cornell	University,	July	15,	1934;	vol.	26,	page	157;	Cornell	University	Library.	
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Figure	1.	Diagram	of	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	showing	provinces	where	Taiwanese	technical	
assistance	was	rendered	during	the	first	fourteen	years	of	the	assistance	mission	from	1959	to	
1973.16	
	
Under	Ma’s	guidance,	the	Crop	Improvement	Mission	produced	lengthy	reports	on	
the	 state	 of	 Vietnamese	 agriculture.	 Rice	was	 a	 key	 concern,	 given	 that	 Vietnam,	 like	
Taiwan,	was	primarily	a	 rice-consuming	culture.	 In	1964,	Taiwanese	experts	estimated	
that	approximately	2.5	million	hectares	produced	5	million	metric	tons	of	rice	annually	
in	 Vietnam.17	One	 of	 the	 key	 reports,	 titled	 “Rice	 Seed	 Production	 in	 Vietnam,”	 was	
                                                 
16	Jin	Yanggao,	“Twelve	Years	in	Vietnam”	[十二年在越南],	June	1973;	Joint	Commission	for	
Rural	Reconstruction;	Council	of	Agriculture	Library,	Executive	Yuan.	
17	This	is	roughly	6.2	million	acres	and	5.5	million	tons.	“越南農村改進部官員來華考察肥料配銷”	
[Observation	on	Taiwan	fertilizer	distribution	by	Vietnamese	officials],	September	26,	1964;	
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published	 in	February	1960.18	It	 surveyed	and	summarized	rice	production	 in	 the	RVN,	
examining	each	step	from	production	to	district	farmers,	 including	 inspection,	storage,	
distribution,	 financial	 subsidies,	 and	dissemination	of	 information.	The	broad	 scope	of	
the	 report	mirrored	 1950s	 JCRR	 reforms	 in	 Taiwan,	where,	 in	 addition	 to	 focusing	 on	
plant	 breeding	 and	 application	 of	 new	 agricultural	 seeds	 and	 technologies,	 JCRR	
technicians	 also	 developed	 farmers’	 associations	 that	 served	 as	 intermediaries	 for	
providing	 agricultural	 credit	 and	 selling	 agricultural	 products	 to	 wholesalers	 and	 the	
market.	 Taiwanese	 studies	 in	 Vietnam	 also	 took	 into	 account	 new	 ideas	 of	 applied	
economics	 and	 agricultural	 extension	 that	 worked	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 surveys	 and	
policymaking.	
The	 report’s	 primary	 concern	 was	 plant	 breeding.	 The	 Crop	 Improvement	 Team	
observed	 that	 rice	 produced	 in	 Vietnam	 originated	 mostly	 from	 government-run	
primary-seed	multiplication	farms.	The	rice	produced	from	the	primary	farms	were	sent	
to	 secondary-seed	 multiplication	 farms	 that	 then	 produced	 enough	 seeds	 to	 be	
distributed	 to	 farmers	 to	 plant	 for	 the	 season.	 One	 significant	 problem	 was	 at	 the	
primary	 level,	 multiplication	 seed	 was	 filtered	 only	 for	 off-types,	 rice	 varieties	 not	
intended	for	distribution	onward.	As	a	result,	the	team	wrote	that	“the	desirable	level	of	
purity	can	hardly	be	thus	maintained,”	implying	that	standards	for	multiplied	rice	were	
too	 lax.19	Furthermore,	 selection	 for	 the	 primary-seed	multiplication	 farms	was	made	
fifteen	years	prior	to	the	report,	in	1945,	and	no	further	selection	was	performed	on	a	
regional	basis	at	 the	secondary-seed	multiplication	 farm	 level.	The	report	 implied	 that	
Vietnam	was	 relying	on	outdated	 rice,	 and	 that	 selecting	newer	 varieties	would	 likely	
improve	 production.	 The	 team	 suggested	 instead	 that	 the	 government	 agencies	
responsible	for	rice	breeding	work	closely	with	the	seed	multiplication	farms	in	order	to	
select	and	produce	seeds	that	were	suitable	for	the	local	regions	they	supplied.	
This	recommendation	on	seed	multiplication	was	in	line	with	the	fundamentals	of	
agricultural	 science	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century—with	 its	 focus	 on	 production	 using	
disciplined,	 rationalized	 practices—that	 helped	 define	 the	 Green	 Revolution.	 In	 this	
case,	 improving	 the	national	 seed	production	 system	adhered	 to	 the	goal	of	 scientific	
selection	and	breeding,	which	was	to	create	higher-yielding	seeds	rather	than	allowing	
the	multiplication	of	 lower-yielding	varieties.	 Localization	was	also	a	part	of	 selection,	
which	 involved	 ensuring	 that	 varieties	 accommodated	 the	 specific	 soils,	 climates,	
growing	 seasons,	 and	other	 conditions	 in	 the	wide	 rural	 areas	where	 seeds	would	 be	
distributed.	
                                                                                                                                     
Digital	Collection	Number	數位典藏號	020-011002-0087;	page	15;	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	
Collection,	Academia	Historica,	Taiwan.	
18	Tài	liệu	của	phái	bộ	kĩ	thuật	Trung	Hoa	dân	quốc	ở	Việt	Nam	về	việc	sản	xuất	lúa	giống	ở	Việt	
Nam	năm	1960	[ROC	technical	team	in	Vietnam	report	on	Vietnam	rice	production],	February	
1960;	Folder	1313;	Nha	Canh	Nông	[Directorate	of	Agriculture],	VNA.	
19	Tài	liệu	của	phái	bộ	kĩ	thuật	Trung	Hoa	dân	quốc	ở	Việt	Nam	về	việc	sản	xuất	lúa	giống	ở	Việt	
Nam	năm	1960,	page	21.		
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Rationalization	also	extended	to	cultural	practices,	such	as	maintaining	precise	and	
consistent	distance	between	rice	seedlings	to	ensure	enough	room	for	growth	without	
underutilizing	 much	 needed	 land.	 Taiwanese	 farmers	 introduced	 new	 agricultural	
implements	 that	 could	 aid	 Vietnamese	 farmers	 in	 easily	 marking	 distances	 through	
imprinting	grids	in	the	soil	(figure	2).	
	
	
	
Figure	2.	A	Taiwanese	technician	teaching	a	Vietnamese	farmer	how	to	use	an	implement	to	
mark	rice	spacing	in	order	to	maintain	ideal	distance	while	transplanting	rice	seedlings.20	
	
In	 the	 following	 years,	 the	 Chinese	Agricultural	 Technical	Mission	 (CATM),	 as	 the	
ROC	teams	to	Vietnam	were	collectively	known	early	on,	established	a	rice	experiment	
center	 in	 Mỹ	 Tho,	 located	 in	 the	 Mekong	 delta,	 with	 experiment	 stations	 located	
throughout	Vietnam,	including	Long	Xuyên	and	Cần	Thơ	in	the	Mekong	delta,	and	Phan	
Rang	in	southern	Vietnam.21	The	1968	annual	report	from	the	CATM	indicated	that	the	
Mỹ	Tho	Experiment	Center	had	collected	710	varieties	for	comparative	trials,	including	
84	 newly	 introduced	 foreign	 varieties	 from	 the	 International	 Rice	 Research	 Institute	
(IRRI)	 in	 Los	 Baños	 in	 the	 Philippines,	 and	 37	 varieties	 from	 Cambodia	 and	 Thailand.	
These	 were	 then	 distributed	 to	 the	 regional	 experiment	 stations	 for	 field	 trials	 to	
determine	which	varieties	would	perform	best	for	each	region.	The	seeds	sourced	from	
neighboring	 Southeast	 Asian	 nations	 reflected	 the	 belief	 among	 Taiwanese	 scientists	
                                                 
20	“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果”	[A	pictorial	representation	of	
highlights	of	CATM/VN	activities],	April	1965;	Digital	Collection	Number	006-030202-00011-001;	
Yan	Jiagan	Papers,	Academia	Historica.	
21	Later	CATM	was	changed	to	the	Chinese	Agricultural	Technical	Group	(CATG).	
Martyrs	of	Development	
Cross-Currents	33	|	64	
(and	 IRRI	 scientists)	 that	different	 areas	of	Vietnam	 shared	ecological	 similarities	with	
much	of	Southeast	Asia.	With	terrain	and	geography	as	varied	as	central	and	southern	
Vietnam,	which	spanned	not	just	latitude	but	also	topographical,	precipitation,	and	soil	
variances,	 development	planners	 saw	Vietnam	ecologically	 and	not	 just	 as	 a	bounded	
nation-state.	
IR-8	rice	produced	by	the	IRRI	showed	impressive	yields,	nearly	doubling	the	native	
check	variety	(used	as	a	control)	at	5,744	kg	per	hectare	compared	with	3,049	kg/ha.22	
IR-8,	the	IRRI’s	most	famous	product,	was	often	called	“miracle	rice”	because	of	its	high	
yields,	and	in	Vietnam	it	was	sometimes	TN-8,	short	for	Thần	Nông	(“god	of	agriculture,”	
implying	supernatural	powers)	(Tran	and	Kajisa	2006).	Bred	in	the	early	1960s	as	a	cross	
of	 two	 varieties,	 Indonesian	 Peta	 and	 Taiwanese	 Dee-geo-woo-gen,	 its	 global	
dissemination	 allowed	 for	 significant	 improvements	 in	 yield	 across	 many	 South	 and	
Southeast	Asian	rice-growing	regions.	 IR-8	became	a	defining	contributor	to	the	Green	
Revolution	in	Asia,	though	along	with	monoculture	and	reliance	on	chemical	fertilizers,	
it	also	led	to	dependence	on	chemicals	and	commercialized	agriculture	with	potentially	
disastrous	ecological	consequences	(Cullather	2010;	Shiva	2016).	Assistant	Director	 for	
the	 United	 States	 Agency	 for	 International	 Development	(USAID)/Vietnam,	 James	 P.	
Grant,	 who	 was	 born	 and	 raised	 in	 Beijing	 as	 the	 son	 of	 Canadian	 missionaries	 and	
engaged	 in	 a	 lifelong	 career	 in	 development,	wrote	 to	 Shen	 Zonghan	 of	 his	 visit	 to	 a	
Taiwanese	 demonstration	 plot	 near	 Biên	 Hòa	 where	 IR-8	 was	 being	 planted.	 On	 his	
second	 visit	 a	 year	 later,	 Grant	 remarked	 on	 “the	 fine	 work	 done	 by	 your	 JCRR	
technicians	 in	 Vietnam”	 in	 helping	 to	 transform	 the	 formerly	 “crude	 demonstration	
plot”	to	“a	major	rice	research	center.”	He	included	a	New	York	Times	article	showcasing	
the	 gift	 of	 IR-8	 from	 Vietnam	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 a	 symbol	 of	 its	 gratitude	 as	
appreciation	for	the	United	States	introducing	the	new	cultivar	in	Vietnam.23	
IR-8,	 however,	 did	 not	 do	 well	 in	 all	 field	 tests.	 One	 of	 IR-8’s	 differentiating	
characteristics	was	 its	 semi-dwarfing	allele,	 sd1,	which	 it	 inherited	 from	 its	 Taiwanese	
parent,	Dee-geo-woo-gen.	Dwarfing	allowed	 IR-8	 stalks	be	 short	and	 stocky	and	 resist	
toppling,	which	would	submerge	rice	under	water,	making	it	impossible	to	harvest	and	
thus	reducing	yields.	But,	IR-8	in	Định	Tường	and	Phong	Dinh	suffered	from	the	opposite	
problem.	There,	due	to	higher	rainfall,	water	levels	in	paddy	fields	were	high	enough	to	
submerge	the	shorter	dwarf-type	rice.	The	CATM	instead	suggested	earlier	plantings	in	
April	 and	November	 to	harvest	 in	 July	and	March	and	 thus	avoid	 flooding	 later	 in	 the	
season. 24 	Taiwanese	 efforts	 to	 distribute	 field	 tests	 of	 different	 varieties	 were	 in	
recognition	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	 national-scale	 development	 across	 different	 cultural,	
social,	and	ecological	contexts.	As	historian	David	Biggs	has	argued,	the	specificities	of	
place	and	locality	had	outsized	consequences	for	American	development	on	the	ground	
                                                 
22	This	amounts	to	roughly	5,125	pounds	per	acre	compared	with	2,720	pounds	per	acre.	
23	James	P.	Grant	to	Shen	Zonghan,	November	25,	1968;	Archive	Number	034000000339A;	Folder	
Document	Drafts	“G,”	in	“Shen	Zonghan	Letter	Drafts”;	EYC	AHA.	
24	“駐越農技團第四年度工作報告”	[Agricultural	technical	team	in	Vietnam	Fourth	Annual	Work	
Report],	July	1,	1968;	Digital	Collection	Number	020-011004-0102;	MFAC	AHA.	
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in	An	Giang	Province	(Biggs	2009).	In	the	Taiwanese	missions,	the	downsides	of	using	IR-
8	 were	 avoided	 by	 adjusting	 planting	 seasons	 to	 account	 for	 local	 hydrological	
conditions.	Nonetheless,	the	unexpected	obstacles	facing	IR-8,	known	for	its	miraculous	
yield	 and	 remarkable	 range	 of	 growing	 regions,	 exemplified	 the	 issues	 facing	
development	not	just	by	Taiwanese	teams	in	Vietnam	but	everywhere	in	the	world.	
Taiwanese	 teams	 expanded	 beyond	 rice	 to	 include	 other	 food	 crops,	 including	
onions,	carrots,	garlic,	sweet	potatoes,	watermelon,	soybean,	cabbage,	lettuce,	peanuts,	
sorghum,	 corn,	 and	 mung	 beans	 (figure	 3).	 Varieties	 were	 sourced	 from	 countries	
throughout	the	Global	North	and	South,	such	as	the	United	States,	Australia,	and	Korea.	
Experiment	 stations	 run	 by	 Taiwanese	 compared	 varieties,	which	 could	 include	 up	 to	
twenty-eight	varieties,	as	 in	 the	case	of	onions	ranging	 from	Texas	Early	Grano	502	to	
Early	Lockyer	Brown.25	
	
	
	
Figure	3.	Photograph	comparing	the	American	variety	“Dixie	Queen”	watermelon	(left)	at	14	
kilograms	(more	than	30	pounds)	introduced	by	the	Taiwanese	agricultural	team	compared	to	a	
native	variety	(right)	in	Định	Tường.26	
	
Chemical	 fertilizer	 was	 another	 aspect	 of	 Green	 Revolution	 methods	 touted	 by	
Taiwanese	 teams	 simultaneously	 with	 seeds.	 In	 a	 1964	 report	 from	 the	 Taiwanese	
mission	 to	Vietnam	 to	 the	 JCRR,	 chemical	 fertilizer	was	 identified	as	being	used	 “very	
little”	because	“rice	farmers	are	not	familiar	with	chemical	fertilizers.”	Their	conclusion	
was	 that	 increased	 usage	was	 “absolutely	 necessary.”	 This	 conclusion	 is	 unsurprising,	
                                                 
25	“駐越農技團第四年度工作報告,”	July	1,	1968.	
26	“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”	April	1965.	
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given	the	Green	Revolution	paradigm	of	the	1960s	that	relied	heavily	on	chemicals	and	
varieties	that	responded	well	to	chemical	fertilizer,	despite	it	being	short-sighted	due	to	
the	environmental	consequences.	Taiwan	had	utilized	chemical	fertilizers	extensively	for	
decades,	 dating	 back	 to	 the	 Japanese	 colonial	 era	 (1895–1945),	 and	 relied	 heavily	 on	
chemicals	 for	 its	 own	 agricultural	 miracle	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s.	 In	 the	 resulting	
solution,	 implemented	 at	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 Taiwanese	 team	 in	 Vietnam,	
newly	 established	 Vietnamese	 fertilizer	 committees	 (one	 central	 and	 eighteen	
provincial)	 sold	 fertilizers	 on	 credit	 through	 farmers’	 associations	 and	 cooperatives,	
similar	to	the	system	in	Taiwan.	The	report	detailed	that	logistical	issues	(tardiness	and	
confusion)	were	problematic	but	excusable	given	how	“new”	fertilizer	was.27	
Fertilizer	 usage	 similarly	 followed	 after	 rigorous	 field	 trials	 across	 the	 rice	
experiment	 stations.	 Across	 Ba	 Xuyên,	 Cần	 Thơ,	 Huế,	 and	 Phan	 Rang	 experiment	
stations,	three	types	of	chemical	fertilizers	were	tested	in	growing	rice	at	various	ratios:	
Nitrogen	 (N),	 Phosphorus	 Pentoxide	 (P2O5,	 or	 phosphoric	 acid),	 and	 potassium	 oxide	
(K2O,	 or	 potash).	 Responses	 differed	 dramatically,	 with	 some	 showing	 a	 near-twofold	
increase	 in	 yields,	 whereas	 rice	 grown	 in	 Huế	 responded	 negatively	 to	 fertilizer	
compared	with	use	without	fertilizer.28	
In	 the	 language	 of	 the	 1964	 report,	 the	 Taiwanese	 team	 leader	 described	 how	
“fertilizer	 distribution	 and	utilization	 in	 Taiwan,	Republic	 of	 China,	 has	won	praises	of	
countries	in	Southeast	Asia.”	This	self-affirmation	served	to	encourage	Taipei	to	accept	a	
team	of	four	Vietnamese	fertilizer	distribution	specialists	to	observe	demonstrations	of	
fertilizer	distribution	and	usage	 in	Taiwan,	but	 it	nonetheless	 reinforced	a	narrative	of	
Taiwan’s	success	being	welcomed	and	recognized	by	receiving	countries	like	Vietnam	in	
the	Global	South.29	
	
“Broad	Social	Strata”:	Rural	Organizations,	Gender,	and	Agricultural	Extension	
	
The	ROC	 team	 recommended	a	 series	of	measures	 centered	on	agricultural	 extension	
and	demonstration.	An	early	suggestion	during	the	first	year	of	the	mission	in	early	1960	
was	to	establish	demonstration	fields	for	proper	planting	and	care	of	seeds	selected	by	
the	 state.	 To	 complement	 demonstration,	 the	 team	 suggested	 providing	 training	 in	
conjunction	with	 4-T,	 the	Vietnamese	equivalent	 of	 4-H	 in	 the	United	 States.	 4-T	was	
funded	by	U.S.	agricultural	development	missions	in	Vietnam	(figure	4).	Both	4-T	and	4-
H	were	rural	organizations	that	 integrated	agricultural	and	public	health	practices	as	a	
means	of	community	youth	activity.	The	ROC	recommended	using	4-T	members	along	
with	village	leaders	to	disseminate	information	about	seed	planting.	Other	suggestions	
to	 aid	 knowledge	 dissemination	 included	 printed	 materials,	 similar	 to	 the	 magazine	
Harvest	 (Fengnian	 豐年),	 introduced	 by	 the	 JCRR	 in	 Taiwan.	 Finally,	 the	 report	 also	
                                                 
27	“越南農村改進部官員來華考察肥料配銷,”	September	26,	1964,	page	15.	
28	“駐越農技團第四年度工作報告,”	July	1,	1968.	
29	“越南農村改進部官員來華考察肥料配銷,”	September	26,	1964,	page	15.	
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suggested	 that	Vietnamese	officials	 establish	 contests	 for	 the	highest	per-unit	 area	of	
rice	production,	in	which	the	“winning	farmer	will	receive	[an]	award	and	will	be	asked	
to	 tell	 other	 farmers	 the	 ways	 and	 means	 by	 which	 he	 achieve[d]	 [his]	 goal.”30	By	
incentivizing	 demonstration	 through	 informal	 competition,	 Taiwanese	 experts	 were	
hoping	 to	 create	 new	 information	 venues	 for	 rural	 Vietnamese	 farmers	 to	 learn	 from	
their	own.	
	
	
	
Figure	4.	Chiang	Ching-kuo	(蔣經國,	Jiang	Jingguo),	Premier	of	the	ROC	and	son	of	Chiang	Kai-
shek,	visits	a	4-T	(4-H)	chapter	in	Biên	Hòa	province,	Vietnam.31	
	
Ma	Baozhi	departed	as	the	head	of	the	Crop	Improvement	Mission	after	a	year,	in	
1960,	and	was	replaced	on	a	more	permanent	basis	by	Jin	Yanggao	(金陽鎬,	Yang-kao	
King),	 another	 prominent	 agronomist	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Nanking	 and	 protégé	 of	
Shen	Zonghan.	In	a	report	to	the	JCRR	authored	after	the	end	of	the	Vietnam	mission	in	
1972,	Jin	wrote,	“Vietnam’s	agricultural	environment,	cultivation	methods,	and	cultural	
habits	on	the	whole	are	very	close	to	those	of	Taiwan’s.	Those	who	are	knowledgeable	
on	the	issue	all	believe	that	to	develop	agriculture	one	must	[bixu	必須]	draw	upon	the	
experiences	of	Taiwan	[yi	taiwan	wei	jiejing	以台灣為借鏡].”32	
The	Vietnam	mission	was	not	just	focused	on	the	agricultural	sciences;	the	greatest	
needs	 of	 Vietnam	 were	 perceived	 to	 be	 social	 in	 nature.	 With	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	
Vietnamese	 communists	 in	 northern	 Vietnam,	 the	 RVN	 prioritized	 the	 needs	 of	 its	
farmers,	those	most	vulnerable	to	communist	organization.	Despite	attempts	to	replace	
                                                 
30	Tài	liệu	của	phái	bộ	kĩ	thuật	Trung	Hoa	dân	quốc	ở	Việt	Nam	về	việc	sản	xuất	lúa	giống	ở	Việt	
Nam	năm	1960,	page	21.	
31	Jin	Yanggao,	“Twelve	Years	in	Vietnam,”	June	1973,	page	58.	
32	Jin	Yanggao,	“Twelve	Years	in	Vietnam,”	June	1973,	page	4.	
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French	 colonial	 administrators	 with	 Vietnamese	 administrators	 under	 Diệm’s	
government,	communist	insurgency	was	not	stemmed	by	pacification	campaigns.	Diệm	
and	other	RVN	officials	turned	to	rural	and	community	development,	which	emphasized	
the	community	as	a	durable	unit	of	governance	from	which	positive	social	change	could	
be	replicated	from	the	bottom	up	and	thus	throughout	rural	Vietnam	(Immerwahr	2015;	
Stewart	 2017).	 It	 was	 here	 that	 William	 Fippin’s	 aforementioned	 connection	 with	
Taiwan	was	fateful.	In	May	1959,	approximately	one	month	after	Fippin’s	suggestion	to	
invite	 Taiwanese	 experts	 on	 farmers’	 associations,	 Trần	 Ngọc	 Liên,	 the	 Commissioner	
General	 for	 Cooperatives	 and	 Agricultural	 Credit,	 traveled	 to	 Taiwan	 with	 Fippin	 and	
several	other	RVN	officials	 to	observe	Taiwanese	 farmers’	associations	 firsthand.	After	
the	 trip,	 Liên	 formally	 requested	 Taiwanese	 experts	 in	 farmers’	 associations	 and	
cooperatives.	Ten	Taiwanese	agricultural	experts	were	requested	to	be	sent	to	the	RVN	
on	 a	 six-month	 provisional	 basis,	 to	 “work	 especially	 at	 village	 levels,”	 he	 said,	
“encouraging,	 guiding,	 training,	 and	 assisting	 Vietnam’s	 newly	 formed	 farmers’	
associations	 to	 get	 firmly	 established	 and	 operating.”33	Along	 with	 teams	 from	 other	
“Free	World”	 nations	 brought	 in	 through	 U.S.	 mediation,	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Taiwanese	
technical	mission	would	 help	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 counter-communist	 insurgency	 efforts	
that	were	designed	to	win	the	hearts	and	minds	of	the	Vietnamese	peasants.	
On	October	27,	1959,	RVN	Vice	President	Nguyễn	Ngoc	Thơ	sent	the	objectives	and	
scope	of	 the	Taiwanese	assistance	mission	 in	 farmers’	associations	 to	eleven	province	
chiefs.34	The	 October	 agreement	 increased	 the	 Taiwanese	 technicians	 to	 eleven,	 of	
which	eight	were	 focused	on	establishing	 farmers’	 associations	and	 cooperatives;	 two	
on	 fisheries	and	crop	cooperatives;	and	the	 final	one	on	training.	The	eight	men	were	
split	 into	 three	 teams	 and	 responsible	 for	 vast	 territories	 of	 central	 and	 southern	
Vietnam,	 roughly	 four	 to	 five	 provinces	 per	 team.	 After	 familiarizing	 themselves	with	
local	 conditions,	 the	 RVN	 regime	 placed	 the	 onus	 on	 local	 governments	 “to	 let	 these	
specialist	conduct	their	activities	without	hindrance”	and	furthermore	“have	new	ideas	
and	make	clear	problems	that	require	specialists’	help	and	investigation”	to	send	up	to	
the	 Central	 Farmers’	 Association	 Committee	 and	 central	 government	 authorities.35	
Though	spread	thin,	the	Taiwanese	advisors	were	handed	the	task	of	new	ideas	within	
                                                 
33	Huỳnh	Văn	Điểm	to	William	Fippin,	April	3,	1959;	“駐越農技團	(I)”	[Agricultural	technical	team	
in	Vietnam,	vol.	1];	Archival	Collection	Number	020000030452A;	MFAC	AHA.	
34	Tài	liệu	của	văn	bộ	Công	Chánh	và	giao	thông	về	chương	trình	hoạt	động	của	chuyên	viên	Đài	
Loan	về	hiệp	hội	nông	dân	và	giai	đoạn	thực	hành	các	cấp	hiệp	hội	nông	dân	liên	hệ	đến	bộ	Công	
Chánh	năm	1959	[1959	correspondence	with	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	regarding	the	activity	
plans	of	Taiwanese	specialists	in	implementing	and	assisting	farmers’	associations],	October	27,	
1959,	Folder	202,	Bộ	Công	Chánh	và	Giao	Thông	[Ministry	of	Public	Works	and	Transportation],	
VNA.	
35	Tài	liệu	của	văn	bộ	Công	Chánh	và	giao	thông	về	chương	trình	hoạt	động	của	chuyên	viên	Đài	
Loan	về	hiệp	hội	nông	dân	và	giai	đoạn	thực	hành	các	cấp	hiệp	hội	nông	dân	liên	hệ	đến	bộ	Công	
Chánh	năm	1959,	October	27,	1959,	Folder	202.	
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the	 local	 governments	 that	 would	 be	 actionable,	 and	 thus	 contribute	 to	 the	 South	
Vietnamese	regime’s	efforts	to	expand	a	national	rural	policy.	
Taiwanese	 farmers’-association	 experts	 were	 called	 upon	 to	 enact	 a	 rural	
development	model	 that	emphasized	grassroots	 interactions	with	 farmers.	On	April	9,	
1959,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 (MOFA)	 sent	 a	memorandum	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	
Economic	Affairs.	In	the	memo,	MOFA	outlined	the	work	details.	First,	“work	comes	into	
contact	with	 broad	 social	 strata,	 including	 central	 and	 local,	 to	 the	 lowest	 stratum	of	
village	 farmers’	associations.”36	Next,	 “work	 scope	 includes	matters	 related	 to	 leading,	
extension,	 and	 training,	 with	 achieving	 farmer-association	 self-sufficiency	 and	
independence	as	the	objective.”37	These	objectives	were	supplemented	by	goals	of	the	
farmers’	association	to	“produce	agricultural	products.”38	The	focus	on	the	lowest	levels	
of	 Vietnamese	 social	 strata	 reflected	 the	 rural	 emphasis	 of	 development	 from	 the	
Taiwanese	model	and	the	desire	to	engage	at	the	village	level.	The	Taiwanese	success	at	
organizing	 and	 utilizing	 farmers’	 associations	 to	 extend	 agricultural	 knowledge	 and	
distribute	fertilizer	matched	the	Vietnamese	needs.	
In	 defining	 how	 these	 projects	 would	 be	 carried	 out,	 Taipei	 chose	 a	 different	
approach	 from	 the	 United	 States.	 Whereas	 U.S.	 development	 agencies	 such	 as	 the	
International	Cooperation	Administration	chose	to	send	experts	with	extensive	scientific	
training	 for	 its	missions	 abroad,	 Taiwanese	planners	 predominantly	 sought	 blue-collar	
technicians	to	work	directly	with	Vietnamese	farmers.	As	MOFA’s	April	9	memorandum	
continued,	Taiwanese	“workers	do	not	require	higher	education,	but	rather	require	long	
term	 service	 in	 farmers’	 associations	 or	 related	 organizations	 as	well	 as	wide	 ranging	
practical	 experience	 managing	 farmers’	 associations	 or	 related	 organizations.”39	This	
change	 was	 pragmatic,	 reflecting	 the	 importance	 of	 on-the-ground	 experience	
interacting	 with	 “the	 lowest	 stratum”	 of	 rural	 society.	 It	 also	 saved	 on	 costs—
technicians	 received	 significant	 hardship	 bonuses	 for	working	 abroad	 in	Vietnam,	 and	
many	were	eager	to	take	the	salary	bump.	Even	the	relatively	few	scientists	who	led	the	
technical	teams	were	represented	as	working	in	the	rural	countryside	with	Vietnamese	
farmers.	 In	 reports	 written	 for	 audiences	 outside	 Taiwan,	 especially	 Americans	 and	
“Free	World”	 allies	 like	 the	 RVN,	 Taiwanese	 documents	 presented	 university	 science	
professors	as	working	“shoulder	to	shoulder”	with	Vietnamese	farmers.40	
An	 interview	 with	 Zhang	 Jiming	 張基明 ,	 a	 retired	 Taiwanese	 technician	 who	
worked	in	Vietnam	from	1968	to	1969,	indicated	that	the	majority	of	technicians	were	
recruited	 from	agricultural	 vocational	 schools	 (nongxiao	農校).	 Zhang	 graduated	 from	
Taichung	Agricultural	Vocational	High	School	(Taizhong	gaonong	台中高農)	in	agronomy	
                                                 
36	Memo	from	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	Deputy	Minister	of	Economic	Affairs,	April	9,	1959,				
“駐越農技團	(I)”	[Agricultural	technical	team	in	Vietnam,	vol.	1];	Archival	Collection	Number	
020000030452A;	MFAC	AHA.	
37	Memo	from	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	Deputy	Minister	of	Economic	Affairs,	April	9,	1959.	
38	Memo	from	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	Deputy	Minister	of	Economic	Affairs,	April	9,	1959.	
39	Memo	from	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	Deputy	Minister	of	Economic	Affairs,	April	9,	1959.	
40	“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”	April	1965.	
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(zonghe	nongyi	綜合農藝).	He	underwent	two	months	of	training	designed	by	the	JCRR	
for	 technicians	 performing	 technical	work	 abroad,	 and	was	 assigned	 to	 a	 four-person	
team	approximately	35	kilometers	(nearly	22	miles)	northwest	of	Saigon.	Zhang	engaged	
in	all	manner	of	work,	from	demonstration	to	extension,	thus	showing	local	Vietnamese	
farmers	how	to	plant	rice,	grains,	vegetables,	and	use	agricultural	equipment	(figure	5).	
At	each	stage,	representatives	from	local	Vietnamese	farmers’	associations	were	invited	
to	 their	 Taiwanese	 team’s	 demonstration	 farm.	 Usually	 every	 day	 after	 dinner,	
Taiwanese	 technicians	 held	 meetings	 for	 one	 to	 two	 hours	 to	 teach	 about	 ten	
Vietnamese	 farmers	 different	 agronomic	 techniques. 41 	Taiwanese	 technicians	 also	
trained	 a	 number	 of	 Vietnamese	 farmers	 to	 serve	 as	 extension	 agents,	 who	 then	
qualified	to	serve	as	instructors	for	other	Vietnamese	farmers	(figure	6).	
	
	
	
Figure	5	(left).	National	Taiwan	University	Professor	C.	I.	Lin	(left)	demonstrates	transplanting	rice	
“shoulder	to	shoulder”	with	Vietnamese	farmers.42	
	
Figure	6	(right).	As	part	of	the	agricultural	extension	and	demonstration	program,	Taiwanese	
technicians	trained	selected	Vietnamese	farmers	to	serve	as	demonstration	supervisors.	This	
picture	shows	Taiwanese-trained	supervisors	teaching	soybean-planting	methods	to	other	
Vietnamese	farmers.43	
	
Taiwanese	 extension	 and	 demonstration	 teams	 in	 Vietnam	 worked	 not	 only	 in	
agricultural	 sciences	 and	 farmers’	 associations,	 but	 also	 in	 “home	 improvement.”	
Demonstration	 centers	 included	 rural	 handicraft	 production	 equipment	 that	 could	 be	
utilized	within	“home	economics,”	a	gendered	notion	that	home-based	 labor	was	also	
productive	 labor.	 In	 the	 1960s,	 Taiwan	 rural	 organizations	 like	 4-H	 had	 begun	 to	
organize	women	 to	produce	handicrafts	 that	 could	 then	be	 sold	 in	markets	 (figure	7).	
This	 endeavor	 was	 linked	 to	 4-H	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 where	 4-H	 originated,	 and	 its	
gendering	 of	 boys	 and	 girls	 (Rosenberg	 2015).	 State	 gendering	 of	 Taiwanese	 rural	
society,	usually	along	with	community	development,	persisted	well	into	the	1990s	with	
                                                 
41	Zhang	Jiming,	interview	by	James	Lin,	January	14,	2019.	
42	“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”	April	1965.	
43	“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”	April	1965.	
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Taiwanese	government	promotion	of	married–women’s	labor	to	fuel	rural	home-based	
production	 that	 formed	 the	 “satellite	 factories”	 of	 Taiwan’s	 later	 industrialized	
economic	 growth	 (Hsiung	1996).	 In	Vietnam,	women	played	a	prominent	 role	 in	 rural	
areas.	Zhang	Jiming	indicated	that	by	the	time	of	his	arrival	in	Vietnam,	most	men	were	
involved	 in	 the	 ongoing	 war,	 and	 thus	 women	 often	 participated	 in	 extension	 and	
demonstration	activities	(figure	8).44	
	
	 	
	
Figure	7	(left).	“Home	improvement	agents”	shown	here	are	using	a	straw-rope	making	machine	
at	a	Taiwanese	demonstration	center	in	Biên	Hòa.45	
	
Figure	8	(right).	Vietnamese	farmers	visit	a	Taiwanese	demonstration	farm.46	
	
Although	most	extension	and	demonstration	activities	were	performed	in	person	at	
demonstration	centers	and	farms,	they	were	also	complemented	by	written	materials.	
In	 Taiwan,	 farmers’	 associations	 and	 government	 agents	 distributed	 magazines,	
pamphlets,	 and	 other	 materials	 as	 a	 core	 strategy	 in	 extension.	 For	 example,	 in	
conjunction	with	 the	U.S.	 Information	Service,	 the	 JCRR	wrote	and	distributed	 in	 rural	
areas	of	Taiwan	the	magazine	Harvest,	which	included	morality	tales,	comics,	and	other	
means	of	attracting	a	wide	swath	of	Taiwanese	rural	society.	
Taiwanese	 development	 utilized	 written	 materials	 in	 Vietnam	 as	 well.	 In	 one	
instance	 in	 1973,	 a	 Vietnamese	 request	 for	 an	 emergency	 shipment	 of	 Taiwanese	
fertilizers	and	seeds	was	accompanied	with	a	pamphlet	on	the	proper	usage	of	fertilizer	
in	Vietnamese.	The	cover,	simply	titled	“Seed	and	Fertilizer	Usage	Guide,”	also	indicated	
that	the	seeds	and	fertilizers	were	“a	gift	of	the	Republic	of	China”	with	a	short	message	
that	wished	“peace	and	happiness”	to	“the	prosperous	village	farmers	of	the	Republic	of	
Vietnam.”47 	The	 guide	 elaborated	 on	 the	 technical	 contents	 of	 fertilizer,	 including	
                                                 
44	Interview	with	Zhang	Jiming,	January	14,	2019.	
45	“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”	April	1965,	page	20.	
46	“嚴家淦總統數位照片─臺灣農技團在越南工作成果,”	April	1965,	page	32.	
47	“種子及肥料使用說明書”	[Seed	and	fertilizer	usage	instructions],	January	27,	1973.	“我緊急
支援越南農作物種子及肥料”	[ROC	emergency	aid	of	agricultural	products,	seeds,	and	fertilizer	
to	Vietnam];	page	265;	Digital	Collection	Number	020-011008-0007.	MFAC	AHA.	
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chemical	composition,	but	was	also	a	means	to	showcase	the	humanitarian	actions	and	
goodwill	of	Taiwanese	assistance.	Boxes	containing	vegetable	seeds	were	adorned	with	
flags	 of	 the	 ROC	 and	 RVN	 side	 by	 side,	 showing	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 gift	 along	 with	
partnership	for	the	RVN	peoples	(figure	9).	
	
	
	
Figure	9.	A	Vietnamese	recipient	of	Taiwanese	aid.	The	box	is	adorned	with	the	two	flags	of	the	
Republic	of	China	and	Republic	of	Vietnam.48	
	
In	the	official	ceremony	handing	over	the	roughly	fifty	thousand	packages	of	seeds	
and	 fertilizer,	 ROC	Ambassador	 to	 Vietnam	Xu	 Shaochang	許紹昌	 gave	 a	 speech	 that	
outlined	ROC	perspectives	on	the	alliance.	Throughout	the	speech,	he	emphasized	that	
the	 ROC	was	 similar	 to	 the	 RVN	 in	 social	 and	 cultural	 terms:	 the	 gift	 was	 “from	 one	
farming	people	to	another.”	In	relaying	the	hopes	of	the	ROC,	the	ambassador’s	speech	
also	 evoked	modernist	 language	of	 economic	prosperity	 as	well	 as	 valorization	of	 the	
rural.	The	seeds	and	 fertilizer	were	 intended	 to	give	“a	helping	hand	 to	 the	 individual	
small	farmer	to	stand	on	his	own	feet	again.”	These	packages	to	individual	farmers	were	
accompanied	by	a	large	amount	of	“high-yielding	hybrid	corn	seed”	that	was	“designed	
for	 the	 purpose	 of	 demonstrating	 profitable	 corn-growing	 in	 various	 provinces	 in	
Vietnam	to	pave	the	way	for	 large-scale	production	of	corn	both	for	domestic	use	and	
for	export	in	the	future.”49	The	capitalist	language	focused	on	the	scientific	modernism	
of	high-yielding	hybrids	in	order	to	achieve	high	productivity	and	large	export	numbers,	
                                                 
48	“我政府贈越種子肥料？運送分發照片”[ROC	Government	gift	of	seeds	and	fertilizer	shipping	
and	distribution	pictures]	January	27,	1973;	Digital	Collection	Number	020-011008-0007.	MFAC	
AHA.	“我緊急支援越南農作物種子及肥料,”	page	261.	
49	“我贈越肥料種子農具值一億七千萬”	[ROC	gifts	Vietnam	fertilizer,	seeds,	and	agricultural	
tools	worth	170	million],	May	10,	1973;	Digital	Collection	Number	020-011008-0007.	MFAC	AHA.	
“我緊急支援越南農作物種子及肥料,”	page	261.	
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aimed	 at	 resolving	 both	 problems	 of	 basic	 human	 need	 and	 national	 economic	
prosperity.	
Martyrdom	and	Identity:	Representing	Overseas	Development	at	Home	
	
In	 Taiwan,	 the	 continued	 demand	 for	 Taiwanese	 development	 assistance	 abroad	was	
continually	reported	on	domestic	news	outlets.	On	a	regular	basis	from	1959	until	1975,	
newspaper	 articles	 delivered	updates	on	 the	progress	 and	 incidents	of	 the	 Taiwanese	
team	 in	Vietnam.	Though	often	short,	 the	updates	compensated	for	 their	brevity	with	
regularity.	 Major	 Taiwanese	 newspapers	 reported	 on	 changes	 in	 team	 leadership,	
project	 accomplishments,	 and,	 particularly,	 contract	 renewals.	 These	 publications,	
which	at	the	time	were	run	by	or	closely	affiliated	with	the	GMD	regime,	served	official	
state	interests	by	reporting	on	the	efforts	of	the	ROC	abroad	to	help	developing	nations.	
The	response	to	the	1963	death	of	Taiwanese	rice	technician	Zhang	Dusheng,	in	the	
introduction	 to	 this	article,	demonstrated	the	 importance	of	overseas	development	 to	
ROC	 foreign-policy	officials.	 Zhang	was	born	 in	1935	and	 raised	 in	Tainan,	 in	 southern	
Taiwan.	 After	 graduating	 from	 Tainan	 No.	 1	 High	 School,	 he	 enrolled	 in	 Taiwan	
Provincial	Agricultural	College	in	Taichung	(today	National	Chung	Hsing	University	國立
中興大學)	 for	 his	 secondary	 education.	Upon	 graduation,	 he	 underwent	 training	 as	 a	
reserve	 officer	 and	 was	 assigned	 to	 grassroots	 political	 organization	 work.	 After	
completing	 his	 military	 service,	 he	 briefly	 taught	 at	 the	 Yuanlin	 Agricultural	 School	
(Yuanlin	nongxiao	員林農校)	in	1961	before	moving	on	to	work	at	the	Taichung	District	
Agricultural	 Improvement	 Station	 (Taizhong	 nongye	 gailiang	 chang	 台中農業改良場)	
where	 he	 worked	 for	 two	 years	 in	 rice	 improvement.	 On	 October	 10,	 1963,	 he	 left	
Taiwan	to	join	the	Taiwanese	Agricultural	Technical	Assistance	Team	to	Vietnam.	
Zhang	was	killed	in	the	line	of	duty	by	Vietnamese	communist	forces	on	November	
13,	1963.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	he	was	returning	to	Saigon,	after	visiting	a	
rice	experiment	station	outside	Saigon,	when	he	“met	a	Vietnamese	communist	ambush	
and	was	killed”	along	with	a	Vietnamese	translator.50	Taiwanese	technicians	occasionally	
were	 caught	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 military	 operations—another	 incident	 involving	 three	
Taiwanese	technicians	being	surrounded	by	Vietnamese	communist	troops	occurred	in	
Huế	in	1968—but	usually	the	technicians	emerged	without	issue	due	to	intervention	by	
allied	 (typically	 American)	 forces	 or	 Việt	 Cộng	 recognition	 that	 Taiwanese	 technicians	
were	 noncombatants.51	One	 of	 my	 interviewees	 thought	 it	 likely	 that	 Zhang’s	 group	
panicked	 upon	 being	 ambushed	 by	 Vietnamese	 communists,	 who	 usually	 did	 not	
explicitly	 target	 Taiwanese	 agricultural	 technicians	 for	 attacks,	 and	 panicking	 and	
attempting	 to	 flee	 instead	 of	 surrendering	 and	 being	 taken	 prisoner	 resulted	 in	 the	
                                                 
50	“農復會定期 追悼張篤生”	[JCRR	periodical	mourning	Zhang	Dusheng].	聯合報	[United	daily	
news],	November	20,	1963.	
51	Shen	Zonghan	to	Austin	B.	Sanford,	April	26,	1968;	Archive	Number	034000000357A;	
Document	Drafts	“S,”	in	“Shen	Zonghan	Letter	Drafts”;	EYC	AHA.	Shen	Zonghan	to	Willie	Cook,	
April	26,	1968;	Archive	Number	034000000330A;	Document	Drafts	“C,”	in	“Shen	Zonghan	Letter	
Drafts”;	EYC	AHA.	
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unfortunate	 deaths.	 One	 memorandum	 sent	 by	 the	 Taiwanese	 technical	 team	 to	 a	
Vietnamese	agricultural	official	 referenced	“Vietcong	 snipers”	as	being	 responsible	 for	
Zhang’s	 death. 52 	Yet	 newspaper	 portrayals	 of	 the	 incident	 omitted	 many	 details,	
pointing	 instead	 to	 the	 patriotic	 nature	 of	 Zhang’s	 work	 and	 the	 work	 in	 general	
conducted	by	the	Taiwanese	agricultural	technical	teams.	
Newspaper	 editorials,	 especially	 those	 from	 GMD-affiliated	 publications,	 United	
Daily	News	(Lianhe	bao	聯合報)	and	Cheng	Hsin	Daily	News	(Zhengxin	xinwenbao	徵信
新聞報),	provided	venues	for	the	GMD	to	use	development	as	a	means	of	propaganda.	
One	United	Daily	News	article	cited	Provincial	Department	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	
Director	 Zhang	 Huiqiu	 (張慧秋,	 H.	 T.	 Chang.	 After	 being	 interviewed	 following	 the	
death,	Zhang	Huiqiu	stated	that	Zhang	Dusheng	was	“exactly	the	type	of	youth	that	our	
country	needs.”	Elaborating	further,	Zhang	Huiqiu	explained	that	young	technicians	like	
Zhang	 Dusheng	 served	 a	 crucial	 role.	 Since	 1953,	 Taiwan’s	 agriculture	 “had	 primarily	
relied	 on	 practical	 and	 relatively	 simple	 experimental	 research	 results,”	 but	 by	 1963	
“had	 already	 attained	 such	 high	 levels,	 that	 in	 order	 to	 further	 develop,	 it	 requires	
engaging	in	even	more	refined	and	profound	research.”	Thus,	going	abroad	to	Vietnam	
represented	 positive	 opportunities	 for	 experts	 like	 Zhang	 Dusheng,	 whereas	 work	 in	
Taiwan	 was	 often	 “poorly	 compensated,”	 so	 that	 they	 could	 “on	 the	 one	 hand	
accomplish	 our	 national	 mission	 of	 assisting	 our	 allies,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 after	
accumulating	savings,	return	home	to	work	with	peace	of	mind.”53	
Zhang	Huiqiu’s	goal	 in	emphasizing	aspects	of	pragmatism	and	advanced	research	
not	 only	 reinforced	 that	 Taiwan	 possessed	 unique	 and	 useful	 expertise	 but	 also	
informed	the	domestic	Taiwanese	audience	about	the	reasons	Taiwanese	youth	needed	
to	 be	 abroad	 in	 Vietnam—to	 benefit	 both	 their	 own	 careers	 and	 their	 nation.	 Zhang	
Dusheng’s	 status	 as	 benshengren	 本省人,	 or	 native	 Taiwanese,	 was	 never	 explicitly	
mentioned	 in	 these	 accounts;	 under	 an	 official	 GMD	 policy	 that	 treated	 the	
benshengren	 as	 Chinese,	 official	 accounts	 did	 not	 acknowledge	 such	 ethnic	 divisions.	
However,	Zhang’s	birthplace	of	Tainan	was	mentioned	on	occasion,	and	combined	with	
his	birth	year	1935	predating	the	arrival	of	the	GMD,	the	reader	could	easily	deduce	that	
Zhang	was	benshengren.	Many	of	the	blue-collar	technicians	who	worked	in	rural	areas	
in	Taiwan	and	then	were	sent	abroad	to	Vietnam	and	other	foreign	locales	in	the	1960s	
were	benshengren	like	Zhang,	as	opposed	to	the	bureaucrats	and	scientists	in	positions	
of	power	like	Shen	Zonghan	and	Ma	Baozhi,	who	were	waishengren	外省人,	“mainland	
Chinese”	who	 arrived	 in	 Taiwan	with	 the	GMD	 in	 1949.	 Zhang’s	 common	background	
                                                 
52	“News	Releases	Regarding	Death	of	JCRR	Technician	by	Vietcong	Snipers,”	Office	Memorandum	
from	Chinese	Technical	Mission	to	Vietnam	on	Crop	Improvement	to	Doan	Minh	Quan,	Chief,	Rice	
Service,	December	2,	1963;	Folder	842,	Bản	dịch	các	bài	báo	Taiwan	liên	quan	đến	cái	chết	của	ông	
Tu-Sun-Chang,	thành	viên	phái	đoàn	kĩ	thuật	canh	nông	Trung	Hoa	Dân	Quốc	đến	Việt	Nam	năm	
1963	[Translation	of	Taiwan	articles	related	to	the	death	of	Tusun	Chang,	member	of	the	ROC	
agricultural	technical	team	to	Vietnam	1963],	Nha	Canh	Nông	[Directorate	of	Agriculture],	VNA.	
53	“張篤生在越殉職”	[The	sacrifice	of	Zhang	Dusheng],	聯合報	[United	daily	news],	November	
16,	1963.	
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perhaps	made	international	development	more	sympathetic	to	benshengren	audiences,	
tying	 in	 the	 political	 and	 diplomatic	 objectives	 of	 the	 waishengren	 GMD	 with	 the	
sacrifices	made	by	benshengren	on	behalf	of	representing	Taiwan	abroad.	
Most	 importantly,	 development	 helped	 legitimize	 the	 GMD	 state	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	
benshengren.	The	need	for	Taiwanese	aid	abroad	and	Taiwanese	willingness	to	put	their	
lives	on	the	line	to	help	other	nations	gave	the	Taiwanese	a	sense	of	nationalistic	pride,	
demonstrating	 “industriousness”	 and	 “scientific	 knowledge,”	 which	 were	 deemed	
superior	Taiwanese	qualities.54	Economic	growth,	humanitarian	 largesse,	and	expertise	
in	 modern	 science	 and	 technology	 were	 the	 characteristics	 that	 the	 GMD	 sought	 to	
cultivate	in	their	public	image	to	maintain	their	authoritarian	grip	on	Taiwan.	
	
The	Overseas	Chinese,	International	Anticommunism,	and	Ideologies	of	State-
Building:	Representing	Taiwanese	Development	Globally	
	
Although	 the	memory	 of	 Zhang	 Dusheng	was	 crafted	 into	 the	 image	 of	 the	 idealized	
Taiwanese	under	the	developmentalist	GMD	at	home,	the	targeted	audiences	were	not	
limited	to	Taiwanese	and	the	rural	Vietnamese.	The	GMD	portrayed	itself	as	the	leaders	
of	“Free	China”	internationally—the	legitimate	Chinese	regime.	This	image	of	Free	China	
included	the	huaqiao	華僑,	the	overseas	Chinese	diaspora.	For	late	Qing	revolutionaries	
such	 Sun	 Yat-sen,	 overseas	 Chinese	 had	played	 an	 important	 role,	 from	 funding	 early	
GMD	 revolutionary	 efforts	 to	 providing	 the	 technical	 expertise	 for	 nation-building	
(Bergère	 1998;	 Soon	 2014).	 During	 the	 Cold	 War,	 the	 overseas	 Chinese	 became	 a	
particularly	important	demographic	for	the	GMD	in	order	to	substantiate	its	own	claims	
of	 legitimacy	 as	 the	 true	 guardians	 of	 “China.”	Without	 the	majority	 of	 its	 territories	
prior	to	its	retreat	in	1949,	the	GMD	made	careful	aims	to	garner	grassroots	support	in	
major	 overseas	 Chinese	 centers,	 such	 as	 the	 West	 Coast	 of	 North	 America	 and	 the	
Philippines,	 as	historian	Chien	Wen	Kung	has	 argued,	 “to	embed	 the	Nationalist	 state	
into	Chinese	society	and	connect	huaqiao	to	Taiwan”	(Kung	2018,	5–6).	
Vietnam	 was	 certainly	 no	 exception.	 Vietnam	 and	 greater	 Southeast	 Asia	 were	
home	to	a	 large	Chinese	population	 that	had	begun	emigrating	during	 the	seventeeth	
century	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Ming	 dynasty.	 Many	 overseas	 Chinese	 originated	 from	
southern	China,	particularly	 speakers	of	Cantonese,	Chaozhou	 (Teochew),	and	Minnan	
(Hokkien).	A	large	number	settled	in	the	southern	Vietnam	city	of	Chợ	Lớn	just	outside	
Saigon	 and	 later	 integrated	 and	 merged	 into	 Saigon	 itself.	 ROC	 official	 diplomacy	
targeted	 these	 Chinese	 populations	 as	 part	 of	 its	 global	 efforts	 to	 build	 a	 huaqiao	
identity	 under	 ROC	 patronage.	 Historian	 Mei	 Feng	 Mok	 argues	 that	 the	 Chinese	
community	in	Chợ	Lớn	in	particular	developed	transnational	diaspora	ties	with	Chinese	
outside	 Vietnam—in	 Taiwan,	 Malaya,	 and	 Hong	 Kong—partially	 through	 the	
connections	fostered	by	the	ROC	state	(Mok	2016,	89).	The	ROC,	 for	example,	offered	
                                                 
54	“Condolence	to	Tusun	Chang,”	Cheng	Hsin	Daily	News,	Taipei,	November	17,	1963.	Translated	
in	Folder	842,	VNA.	
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scholarships	 and	 reserved	 spots	 for	 overseas	 Chinese	 as	 incentives	 for	 Vietnamese-
Chinese	to	attend	universities	in	Taiwan	(Mok	2016,	92).	
Chinese	communities	in	Vietnam	thus	became	another	discursive	battleground	for	
the	GMD	to	win	over.	Utilizing	the	same	phrasing	and	imagery,	Vietnamese	newspapers	
serving	 Chinese	 communities	 in	 Chợ	 Lớn	 and	 elsewhere	 in	 Vietnam	 covered	 GMD	
development.	 One	 of	 the	 largest	 Chinese	 newspapers	 by	 circulation	 in	 Vietnam	 was	
Yuen	Tuong	jih	pao	(Ch.	Yuandong	ribao	遠東日報,	Far	Eastern	daily),	founded	in	1940	
by	a	huaqiao	businessman	of	Chaozhou	descent,	Zhu	Jixing	朱繼興,	and	distributed	as	
far	 as	 Laos	 and	 Cambodia	 (Mok	 2016,	 19).	 Yuen	 Tuong’s	 regular	 columns	 discussed	
matters	 of	 everyday	 life,	 such	 as	 education,	 gender,	 literature,	 and	 film,	 along	 with	
coverage	 of	 ROC	 actions	 in	 Vietnam.	 In	 the	 July	 14,	 1960	 issue	 of	 Yuen	 Tuong,	 a	
journalist	interviewed	then-Crop	Improvement	Mission	head	Ma	Baozhi	and	relayed	the	
goals	of	the	Taiwanese	team	in	beginning	technical	assistance	to	Vietnam.55	Thereafter,	
Yuen	Tuong	reported	with	regularity	the	actions	of	the	Taiwanese	teams,	ranging	from	
visits	of	 irrigation	experts	to	contract	 renewals.56	In	the	aforementioned	1973	instance	
of	Taiwan-gifted	seeds	and	fertilizer,	Yuen	Tuong	reported	on	the	consequences	of	the	
gift	by	borrowing	the	same	language	and	phrasing	used	in	Ambassador	Xu	Shaochang’s	
speech.	 In	 detailing	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 gift,	 Yuen	 Tuong	 noted	 that	 gifted	 seeds	 were	
intended	 “in	 the	 future	 not	 only	 to	 supply	 the	 food	 needs	 of	 this	 nation,	 but	 also	 to	
expand	its	crop	exports.”57		
The	ROC	portrayed	the	Taiwanese-Vietnamese	alliance	in	nationalist,	Asian-centric,	
and	anticommunist	terms	that	appealed	to	the	anticolonial	legacy	of	the	RVN	and	Ngô	
Đình	 Diệm.	 Diệm	 came	 to	 power	 on	 what	 Miller	 has	 called	 “an	 unimpeachable	
reputation	as	a	nationalist”	 that	 culminated	with	deposing	 the	French-backed	Bảo	Đại	
and	ended	French	colonial	influence	in	Vietnam	(2013,	28).	Though	fiercely	anticolonial,	
Diệm	 also	 gained	 U.S.	 support	 for	 his	 regime	 through	 his	 vehement	 anticommunism,	
particularly	against	Hồ	Chí	Minh’s	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam.	As	historian	Nu-Anh	
Tran	has	argued,	the	RVN	engaged	in	an	anticommunist	internationalism	imagining	the	
RVN	 in	 friendships	 with	 Cold	War	 allies	 and	 as	 a	member	 of	 the	 “Free	World”	 (Tran	
2013,	 92).	 This	 anticommunist	 internationalism	 included	 participation	 in	 the	 Asian	
People’s	Anti-Communist	League,	of	which	the	ROC	was	a	founding	member,	along	with	
delegations	 from	 South	 Korea,	 Thailand,	 Macau,	 Hong	 Kong,	 the	 Ryukyu	 Islands	
(Okinawa),	 the	 Philippines,	 and	 the	 RVN. 58 	RVN	 anticommunists	 “conceived	 of	
                                                 
55	“農技團長馬保之對記者談該團此行任務”	[Interview	with	agricultural	technical	team	lead	
Ma	Baozhi	discussing	recent	agricultural	technical	team	mission],	July	14,	1960;	“駐越農技團 (I)”	
[Agricultural	technical	team	in	Vietnam,	vol.	1];	Archival	Collection	Number	020000030452A;	
MFAC	AHA.	
56	“農技團長馬保之對記者談該團此行任務,”	July	14,	1960.		
57	“我贈越肥料種子農具值一億七千萬,”	May	10,	1973.	“我緊急支援越南農作物種子及肥料,”	
page	261.	
58	“Asian	Peoples’	Anti-Communist	Conference,	Minutes	of	the	Opening	Session,”	June	15,	1954;	
History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Digital	Archive,	B-387-039,	Documents	Related	to	the	Asian	
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anticommunist	internationalism	as	the	natural	response	to	communist	imperialism”;	as	
a	result,	the	RVN	regime	emphasized	its	international	relationships	(Tran	2013,	92).	
A	1960	document	from	the	RVN	Ministry	of	Public	Works	and	Transportation,	most	
likely	 a	 Vietnamese	 translation	 of	 an	 ROC	 official	 report	 of	 Diệm’s	 visit	 to	 Taiwan,	
likened	the	two	nations	as	being	“two	peoples	[or	nations,	dân-tộc]	that	share	the	same	
cultural	 root	 which	 communism	 is	 destroying	 now.”59	It	 elaborated	 on	 the	 existential	
threat	of	communism	to	both	nations:	“the	existence	of	two	countries	is	also	currently	
in	danger.”	The	report	praised	the	accomplishments	of	the	GMD’s	1911	revolution	that	
led	to	the	establishment	of	the	ROC	and	Diệm’s	founding	of	the	RVN.60	The	struggles	of	
the	“free”	peoples	of	Asia	became	a	point	of	pride	and	of	common	history.	Both	sides	
perceived	 themselves	 to	 be	 linked	 with	 a	 recent	 revolutionary	 past,	 rooted	 in	 their	
violent	opposition	to	communism.	
Furthermore,	 the	 ROC	 report	 favorably	 compared	 the	 nationalist	 ideologies	
espoused	by	both	leaders,	the	Three	Principles	of	the	People	(sanminzhuyi	三民主義)	—
which	originated	with	Sun	Yat-sen	and	was	adopted	by	Chiang	Kai-shek	as	the	political	
ideology	of	the	ROC—and	Ngô	Đình	Diệm’s	Personalism	(Nhân	vị).61	
Both	 Personalism	 and	 the	 Three	 Principles	 shared	 basic	 tenets.	 Personalism	was	
Diệm’s	 answer	 to	 finding	 a	 path	 between	 radical	 communism	 and	 French	 colonial-
defined	liberalism.	It	can	be	traced	back	to	the	writings	of	French	Catholic	philosopher	
Emmanuel	Mounier,	who	 critiqued	 liberal	 capitalism	and	 individualism	 in	 the	wake	of	
the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s	while	also	rejecting	Marxism	and	its	tendency	toward	
oppression	of	 individuals	(Miller	2013,	46;	Stewart	2017,	95).	Diệm’s	brother	Ngô	Đình	
Nhu,	 who	 played	 a	 crucial	 advisory	 and	 political	 role	 in	 the	 Diệm	 regime,	 became	
exposed	to	Personalism	while	studying	in	France	as	an	archivist.	Eventually	Personalism,	
as	argued	by	historian	 Jessica	Chapman,	became	 the	“official	 state	philosophy”	of	 the	
RVN	under	Diệm	(Chapman	2013,	71).	Phi-Vân	Nguyen	and	other	historians	have	shown	
that	 the	 RVN	 constitution	 of	 1956	 reflected	 Personalist	 principles	 (Tan	 2019;	 Nguyen	
2018).	
Yet,	Personalism	as	articulated	by	Ngô	Đình	Nhu	and	adopted	in	the	RVN	context,	
was	also,	 in	Miller’s	words,	 “maddeningly	opaque”	 (Miller	2013,	46).	 This	opacity	was	
due	 in	 part	 to	 its	 roles	 as	 an	 indigenous	 ideology	 and	 a	 platform	 for	 postcolonial	
consolidation.	As	historian	Geoffrey	Stewart	has	put	it,	the	Ngôs	needed	an	“authentic	
Vietnamese	 ‘cultural	 formula’	 to	 imbue	 the	 population	with	 the	 appropriate	 sense	 of	
national	spirit	to	willingly	participate	in	the	nation-building	process”	(Stewart	2017,	99).	
                                                                                                                                     
Anti-Communist	League	Conference,	Papers	Related	to	Treaty-Making	and	International	
Conferences;	Syngman	Rhee	Institute,	Yonsei	University.	
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118328.	
59	Hồ	sơ về	việc	Tổng	Thống	Việt	Nam	viếng	thăm	Đài	Loan	năm	1960	[Summary	of	RVN	
president’s	visit	to	Taiwan	1960],	Undated	(1960);	Folder	1161,	Bộ	Công	Chánh	và	Giao	Thông	
[Ministry	of	Public	Works	and	Transportation];	VNA.	
60	Hồ	sơ	về	việc	Tổng	Thống	Việt	Nam	viếng	thăm	Đài	Loan	năm	1960,	Undated	(1960).	
61	Hồ	sơ	về	việc	Tổng	Thống	Việt	Nam	viếng	thăm	Đài	Loan	năm	1960,	Undated	(1960).	
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Personalism	 was	 this	 formula.	 In	 imagining	 the	 ideal	 Vietnamese	 village,	 the	 Ngôs	
believed	 that	 the	 conservatism	and	 spiritualism	of	 Personalism	were	needed	 to	 enact	
the	social	ties	between	community	and	the	modern	Vietnamese	nation	(Stewart	2017,	
100).	Through	his	examination	of	 the	resettlement	of	northern	refugees	 into	southern	
Vietnam,	 historian	 Jason	 Picard	 has	 argued	 that	 the	Ngôs	 saw	 in	 traditional	 northern	
villages	their	ideal	of	“a	corporate,	close-knit	community”	that	needed	to	be	replicated	
across	rural	Vietnam	(Picard	2016,	84–86).	Personalism	tied	into	this	vision;	hence,	the	
emphasis	on	the	rural	village.	
Like	 Personalism,	 Sun	 Yat-sen’s	 Three	 Principles	 as	 an	 ideology	 provided	
justification	 for	 a	 revolutionary	 regime	 without	 being	 too	 dogmatically	 onerous.	
Beginning	in	1905,	Sun	had	elaborated	publicly	on	the	Three	Principles—minsheng	zhuyi	
民生主義,	 usually	 translated	 as	 “livelihood	 of	 the	 people”	 or	 less	 often	 as	 “welfare”;	
minquan	zhuyi	民權主義,	usually	translated	as	“democracy”;	and	minzu	zhuyin	民族主義,	
usually	 translated	 as	 “nationalism”—as	 an	 organizing	 concept	 for	 his	 revolutionary	
platform,	 culminating	 in	 the	 1924	 published	 eponymous	work.	 Sun	was	 a	 pragmatist,	
and	the	Three	Principles	served	as	a	malleable	political	tool	to	allow	Sun	and	the	ROC	to	
garner	popular	political	support	in	an	anti-Manchu	and	anti-imperial	sentiment	in	early	
twentieth-century	China.	According	to	Sun	Yat-sen	biographer	Marie-Claire	Bergère,	the	
Three	 Principles	 were	 “a	 work	 of	 propaganda,	 a	 long	 political	 tract	 designed	 to	 win	
followers	 rather	 than	 to	 instill	 conviction,	an	appeal	 to	action	 rather	 than	 to	 thought”	
aimed	to	“diffuse	a	number	of	ideas	rather	than	to	analyze	them”	(Bergère	1998,	353).	
Continuing	 under	 Chiang	 Kai-shek’s	 ROC,	 the	 Three	 Principles	 were	 largely	 used	 as	 a	
symbolic	 platform	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 ROC’s	 welfarist	 or	 revolutionary	 roots	 when	
convenient.	 Integrated	 into	 curricula	 across	 schools	 and	 military	 academies,	 for	
example,	 the	 Three	 Principles	 were	 meant	 to	 build	 loyalty	 to	 and	 support	 for	 the	
authoritarian	ROC	regime.	
Though	 Personalism	 and	 the	 Three	 Principles	 were	 both	 often	 deployed	 for	
propaganda	purposes,	the	consequences	of	that	deployment	often	resulted	in	real	and	
expansive	 networks,	 movements,	 and	 institutions—such	 as	 the	 Asian	 People’s	 Anti-
Communist	 League	 and	 Moral	 Re-Armament—that	 affected	 perceptions	 and	 foreign	
policies.	 As	 historian	 Mitchell	 Tan	 has	 effectively	 argued,	 “the	 production	 and	
proliferation	of	a	national	ideology	was	an	important	way	in	which	nascent	Asian	nation-
states	 like	 the	 RVN	 sought	 to	 define	 themselves	 not	 just	 to	 their	 people	 but	 also	 in	
relationship	to	a	Region	divided,	at	least	in	part,	by	a	conflict	of	ideas”	(Tan	2019,	4).	The	
definition	 and	 legitimation	 of	 the	 GMD	 regime	 were	 unquestionably	 the	 highest	
priorities.	The	Three	Principles	was	not	only	deployed	as	a	political	or	 social	 ideology,	
but	 also	 as	 a	 developmentalist	 one	 as	well.	 Economic	welfare,	 providing	 for	 the	well-
being	 of	 the	 Taiwanese	 and	 global	 peoples	 like	 the	 Vietnamese	 against	 communism,	
became	crucial.	
Alluding	to	common	political	 ideologies	and	revolutionary	origins	was	 inherent	 to	
Taiwan’s	 imagining	of	 its	development	missions	 to	Vietnam	and	the	rest	of	 the	Global	
South.	Taiwan’s	missions	to	Africa	and	land-reform	training	of	Third	World	bureaucrats	
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also	 reflected	 how	 the	 GMD	 became	 adroit	 at	 using	 the	 language	 and	 discourse	 of	
decolonizing	nations	 to	demonstrate	 solidarity	and	commonality.	 In	Vietnam,	 the	ROC	
seized	upon	Personalism,	the	founding	of	the	RVN,	and	the	background	of	Diệm	and	his	
family	to	enable	the	representation	that	it	found	most	ideal,	one	centered	on	Taiwan’s	
revolutionary	and	technical	modernity	and	steadfast	anticommunist	solidarity.	
	
Conclusion	
	
The	Vietnam	mission	proved	to	be,	at	least	in	terms	of	continued	demand	from	the	RVN,	
a	 success	 for	 the	 Taiwanese.	 The	 original	 six-month	 mission	 was	 extended	 to	 three	
years.	 In	 1961,	 the	 JCRR	 attempted	 to	 reassign	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 farmers’	 association	
team,	Yang	Yukun	(楊玉昆,	Y.	K.	Yang),	to	Taiwan,	where	farmers’	associations	needed	
his	attention.	But	Yang’s	reassignment	out	of	Vietnam	resulted	in	a	deeply	impassioned	
plea	from	Trần	Ngọc	Liên	to	the	JCRR’s	chairman	at	the	time,	Jiang	Menglin	蔣夢麟:	
	
The	establishment	of	numerous	Strategic	Hamlets	has	greatly	improved	
security	 conditions	 in	 the	 rural	 areas	 and	 will	 afford	 greater	
opportunities	 to	more	effectively	 expand	 the	 services	of	 our	 [farmers’	
associations].	This	situation	intensifies	the	urgent	need	of	the	specialists	
who	have	become	familiar	with	our	conditions.	...	Mr.	Chairman,	I	must	
earnestly	 request	 that	you	reconsider	your	 three-year	service	policy	 in	
the	light	of	the	present	situation	in	Vietnam.	We	are	deeply	engaged	in	
an	 active	war,	 and	 our	 resources	 are	 stretched	 to	 the	maximum.	 The	
focus	 of	 this	 war	 is	 in	 the	 countryside	 and	 among	 the	 rural	 people.	
Experienced	 direction	 and	 leadership	 is	 of	 special	 importance	 at	 this	
time.62	
	
With	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Strategic	 Hamlet	 program	 that	 sought	
“pacification”	of	rural	villages	by	increasing	support	and	thus	ostensibly	lessening	rural	
ties	 with	 communist	 insurgents,	 the	 RVN	 sought	 Taiwanese	 expertise	 in	 rural	
organization.	By	1970,	 the	United	States	had	contributed	US$2,036,088	 to	 the	Taiwan	
missions,	paying	for	capital	costs	involved	in	technical	assistance.63	In	a	1972	evaluation	
of	the	contract	with	the	ROC,	Ralph	Gleason,	USAID	Deputy	Associate	Director	for	Food	
                                                 
62	Letter	from	Trần	Ngọc	Liên	to	Jiang	Menglin,	December	6,	1962;	“駐越農技團	(II)”	[Agricultural	
technical	team	in	Vietnam,	vol.	2];	Archival	Collection	Number	020000030453;	pages	17–18;	
MFAC	AHA.	
63	Contract	Evaluation,	May	3,	1972;	Folder	3832;	Hồ	sơ	kiểm	soát	ngân	khoản	hợp	đồng	với	phái	
bộ	hợp	tác	tái	thiết	nông	thôn-	Trung	Quốc	về yểm	trợ	tổng	quát	canh	nông	cho	Việt	Nam	năm	
1969–1973	[Documents	pertaining	to	budgeting	and	audits	of	contracts	with	the	Joint	
Commission	for	Rural	Reconstruction	regarding	general	support	for	agriculture	in	Vietnam	in	
1969–1973],	Cơ	quan	phát	triển	quốc	tế	Hoa	Kỳ	[U.S.	Agency	for	International	Development];	
VNA.	
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and	Agriculture	in	Vietnam,	described	the	Taiwanese	mission	as	attaining	mission	goals	
“in	a	very	practical	manner…for	instance,	demonstration	fields	were	elaborately	set	up	
and	operated	by	the	contractor	as	an	intermediate	goal	towards	attainment	of	the	final	
goal	of	widespread	extension	of	improved	varieties	and	cultural	practices.”	As	a	result,	
“farmers	 benefiting	 from	 CATG	 assistance	 have	 experienced	 substantial	 increases	 in	
income	 through	 increased	harvests	of	 crop	produce	of	high	value.”	However,	Gleason	
cast	doubt	on	the	ability	of	the	RVN	to	fulfill	its	end	of	the	agreement,	stating	that	“final	
goal	of	nation-wide	extension	rests	in	the	capacity	and	competence	of	the	cooperating	
country,”	 and	 then	 ended	 by	 lamenting	 that	 “more	 could	 have	 been	 accomplished	 if	
host	 country	 support	were	more	 adequate.”	 In	 a	matter	 of	 a	 few	 years,	Gleason	was	
proved	correct.64	Despite	the	“intermediate”	success	of	the	Taiwanese	technical	mission	
in	realizing	higher	incomes	and	a	system	of	extension	and	demonstration,	these	efforts	
were	ultimately	unable	 to	 save	 the	RVN	 regime.	 Taiwanese	missions	were	 continually	
renewed	until	the	demise	of	the	RVN	in	1975	concluded	Taiwanese	missions	to	Vietnam.		
Taiwanese	 development	 missions	 to	 Vietnam	 began	 a	 decades-long	 project	 to	
portray	 Taiwan	 as	 leading	 a	 vanguard	 of	 the	 developing	world.	 After	 having	 achieved	
success	in	agricultural	science,	farmers’	associations,	and	rural	improvement	in	Taiwan,	
GMD	 planners	 sent	 Taiwanese	 scientists	 and	 technicians	 abroad	 to	 develop	 other	
nations.	Taiwanese	missions	deployed	specific	practices	of	modern	high-yielding	seeds	
and	 chemical	 fertilizers	 to	 reproduce	 Taiwanese	 success.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	GMD	
also	emphasized	Taiwan’s	rural	modernity	as	accomplished	through	a	history	of	success	
in	 farmers’	 associations.	 In	 representations	 of	 Taiwanese	 development	 through	
newspaper	 articles,	 propaganda,	 and	 official	 reports,	 Taiwanese	 planners	 portrayed	
Taiwan	as	a	primarily	rural	society	that	succeeded	through	achieving	modern	science	(of	
developing	 high-yielding	 seeds),	 ingenuity	 (through	 agricultural	 machinery),	 and	 hard	
work	 (of	 farmers	 and	 technicians).	 This	 imaginary	 of	 Taiwanese	 modernity	 marked	 a	
larger	 shift	within	 the	GMD	technocracy	and	 the	ROC	state	 itself,	which	 saw	Taiwan’s	
development	 success	 deployed	 for	 diplomatic	 objectives	 as	 well	 as	 strengthening	 its	
domestic	 rule.	 Not	 only	 did	 the	 ROC	 demonstrate	 its	 anticommunist	 conviction	 to	 a	
“Free	World”	 ally,	 the	 RVN,	 but	 it	 also	 burnished	 its	 developmentalist	 credentials	 at	
home	and	diverted	attention	away	from	its	repressive	authoritarianism.	As	shown	in	the	
official	speeches	and	writings	about	Zhang	Dusheng,	the	GMD	imagined	a	modern	and	
humanitarian	 ROC	 that	 sacrificed	 its	 youth	 to	 save	 other	 nations.	 This	 imagination	
undergirded	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 developmentalist	 platform	 that	 continued	 to	 define	
Taiwan	for	decades	to	come.	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                 
64	Auditing	Report	of	JCRR,	November	14,	1970;	Folder	3832,	VNA.	
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